At 31 December 2022, both funds were showing very clear gains.
A far cry from the promised 8%, but also at a time when valuations went through the roof.
While the Cour des comptes finds nothing to object to in the returns overall, it raises questions on two issues. And that is exactly what Marianne’s headline is about.
BE1 is made up in part of stakes held by Bpifrance. These stakes are housed in a mirror fund, BH1, which is exactly the same as BE1. This fund is subscribed by two independent professional managers, chosen after a regulated tender.
So to value BE1, all you had to do was value what was inside BH1 with the two players in question. Except that the valuation was set in early 2020 and the signing was scheduled for... 12 March 2020. In other words, in the middle of the Covid crisis. And on the day of the markets’ steepest fall.
The CAC 40, the Paris stock market index, over the past 5 years.
So the assets had to be marked down: roughly speaking, sold at a discount. The Cour des comptes report notes that this discount stayed within the maximum limits authorised by the board. And in its published response, Bpifrance confirms that this reflected market trends at the time, and declares itself satisfied with the sale. All the more so because this kind of unlisted stake, with no secondary market, is hard to value and hard to sell.
But here is the thing. In March 2020, everyone knew that unless it was the end of the world, the markets would eventually come to their senses. Even if nobody expected such a fast rebound.
In practice, as soon as the markets recovered, the fund quickly found itself sitting on an unrealised gain, at the very least equal to the discount.
Marianne sums up the facts this way:
Bpifrance, which manages the Republic’s money, was, it says, very generous to the private sector. A good old privatisation of profits, in short.
Before concluding:
Sniffing out a good deal, the investors rushed for the product, it adds, so much so that its sale closed three months ahead of schedule.