💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 05

Pot Luck

To vote, the bondholders have only ClubFunding's messages: no general ledger, no subsidiary accounts, no strategy committee. On 9 April 2025, 12 days before the rate moves to 13%, the platform assures them that the profitability of the group's assets is “confirmed”, “including the BHV Marais”, Merlin's Paris department store.13 3 weeks later, the BHV can already no longer pay its debts: the expert hired by the staff representatives dates its insolvency back to 30 April.14 A business can be profitable on paper and out of cash. About cash, though, the message says nothing, even though Merlin himself, a few months earlier, had put the BHV's overdue supplier invoices at €12M, as the first investigation reported.

While the bondholders wait, the group's banks grant it €96M, in early June 2025, and the Roubaix mall is one of the 6 centres refinanced.15 The Roubaix bondholders see none of it: their maturity has been pushed back by amendment, so nothing obliges the group to repay them now. The same day, other lenders on the platform are luckier: the company that owns Saint-Jacques, in Metz, another ClubFunding loan of the group, disappears in a merger, and its bondholders get all their money back, like those of other group financings, according to the platform. For Roubaix, Lille or Mulhouse, nothing.

At the end of July, another group company, SGM Sirius, borrows another €5.1M, in notes of €100K each: a ticket only wealthy or professional investors can put down. These lenders get from day one what the private investors have been waiting 3 years for: a security trust over the shares, the rents and a reserve for building works. The 2022 bondholders, for their part, still only have the promise: their shares of ORION and CHIRON stay with the fiduciary, with no right for them to seize them. The Roubaix bondholders, who lent to the same group, at the same rate as the 2018 bondholders, come after everyone else.