The story begins in Nice in 1990. A small limited company buying and selling letters and manuscripts. Three employees in offices in Villeneuve-Loubet. Fewer than 200 collectors. Discreet. Almost a cottage industry.
But Gérard Lhéritier thinks bigger. Much bigger. The museums open, first on rue de Nesle, then on boulevard Saint-Germain, next to the publisher Gallimard. Paris, then Brussels. The magazine Plume is bought up. The Rencontres internationales des lettres et manuscrits, an international gathering on letters and manuscripts, draw the great and the good. Finkielkraut, Debré, Giesbert. Poivre d’Arvor, the veteran TV newsreader, even helps promote the investments. The cultural varnish thickens. Books published with Gallimard. Generous patronage: €2.5M to the BNF, France’s national library, for a medieval manuscript. The politician Christian Estrosi receives a De Gaulle speech from Lhéritier’s own hands1.
Respectability can be bought.
Legitimacy can be built.
On a desk, a beautiful glossy brochure. Einstein on the cover. Inside, Hugo, De Gaulle, Sade, Proust, Céline, Baudelaire. Even a letter written four-handed by Van Gogh and Gauguin2. The pages turn. Four eyes scan them. An adviser and his client Thierry R., a business owner who has just sold his company. The words slip into the conversation as if they were self-evident. “Tangible.” “Prestigious.” “Uncorrelated with the markets.” And then, casually: “8 to 9% a year”, sometimes more according to some accounts, presented as “risk-free”.
The client nods. After all, it’s Einstein on the cover, not some common tracker fund. The adviser carries on.
“This is real, sir. Not like the stock market, which could crash tomorrow. A Sade manuscript doesn’t just disappear.”
The client agrees again. The logic seems watertight. The ticket in? Between €10K and €750K. The average is around €80K. Affordable, but substantial.
Except.
Legally, what Aristophil sold were shares in joint ownership (an indivision, the French form of co-ownership). Contracts sometimes christened Amadeus to sound classier. The investor bought an undivided share of a manuscript, not the manuscript itself. With a buy-back option. But careful: a non-binding option. Aristophil was under no obligation to buy back. It was written somewhere in the small print. The returns were presented as guaranteed in the sales pitch, but no contractual guarantee existed. The pitch suggested a liquid exit after 5-7 years. The reality? No secondary market existed. Totally illiquid.
Take the textbook example, the one that appears in every brochure. The Einstein-Besso manuscript.
54 pages written between June 1913 and early 1914 in Zurich. Einstein and his friend Michele Besso, both physicists, wonder whether their emerging theory can explain the anomaly in Mercury’s orbit. 26 pages in Einstein’s hand, 25 in Besso’s, 3 written together. Corrections, crossed-out formulas, notes in the margins. A genuine working draft, one of only two surviving manuscripts documenting the genesis of general relativity. Ordinary mortals won’t understand a word, not least because both of them wrote like a doctor on a bad day, but a whole chapter of the history of science is written there3.
Manuscript excerpt.
Photo: Christie’s
This exceptional document, kept by Besso (because Einstein threw everything away), had been acquired by Aristophil some time before. In the sales documents, it was valued at €12M in shares. With this promise: +40% in value over five years.
Spoiler: in November 2021, at the court-ordered sale run by Christie’s and Aguttes after the liquidation, the very same manuscript went under the hammer for €11.6M4. A world record for a scientific manuscript, admittedly. But also proof that the Aristophil valuation wasn’t completely insane. On that one, at least.
But take another example. Napoleon’s letters to Josephine, the ones where he sends her three kisses. Imperial romance. Lhéritier had bought one for €400K at Christie’s London in 20075. In the Aristophil catalogues, these letters were revalued at more than €1.2M. At the court-ordered auctions of 2019, three letters from the Aristophil stock would fetch a total of €513K6. The gap is striking, but the market had spoken, and it didn’t speak the language of in-house valuations.
The DGCCRF, France’s consumer-protection and anti-fraud authority, put numbers on that gap when it looked into the case: prices inflated by 147% on average compared with the real market7. Up to 317% for some collections8. The diagnosis is as scathing as it is simple: unique objects that are hard to value, clients unable to check the information, a valuation method that was not transparent. In plain English: Aristophil set the prices, Aristophil certified the prices, Aristophil promised those prices would go up.
The value came from the paperwork. Not from the market.
From in-house estimates. Not from real transactions.
That was the Aristophil product. A story told against a backdrop of prestigious manuscripts. A valuation pumped full of helium by in-house appraisals. A promised return disconnected from any market reality. And an exit presented as a sure thing when it was guaranteed nowhere.
Investors thought they were buying history. They were buying an illiquid undivided share they barely understood.
But did the sellers understand?