💥 Zero Bullshit
Epilogue

Final Destination

From 8 September to 3 October 2025, then, twelve hearings will be held to apportion responsibility, and 5 technical questions will shape these three weeks of debate.

First, the legal classification: organised-gang fraud implying deliberate intent, or merely misleading commercial practices born of a gradual drift? The distinction determines the sentences, up to ten years for the former, but above all establishes how organised the fraud was.

Next, the governance of valuations. How could a manuscript bought for €500K generate shares sold for €12M? The committal document mentions average inflation of 147%, peaking at 317%. Who signed off these appraisals, and using what method? The defendants point to how hard it is to value unique objects. The prosecution sees an organised system.

Third knot: the exit promise. The brochures spoke of 8 to 9% a year, of a horizon of 5 to 7 years, of organised liquidity. Aristophil offered a buy-back option presented as quasi-automatic in the sales pitch, but legally non-binding. Recordings of meetings, emails and testimony will shed light on this gap between the pitch and the law.

The role of the intermediaries in the dock is the fourth point. The trial is not examining the 600 to 800 people who distributed the products. It is judging the responsibility of the network heads: did they know the reality behind the valuations? Commissions will obviously be scrutinised as evidence of intent.

Finally, internal traceability. Emails between executives, committee minutes, contracts with introducers: every document will be analysed to establish who knew what, and when. The prosecution is looking for proof of early knowledge that the model was unsustainable. The defence will no doubt plead good faith.

As for the timetable, the trial will run in 3 stages.

  • Week one: reading of the committal order, legal classification, hearing of representative civil parties.
  • Week two: expert evidence on valuations, analysis of the distribution chain, unpicking of the legal structures.
  • Weeks three and four: closing speeches, the prosecution’s sentencing requests, deliberation.

But what the criminal court will not judge is also worth noting.

  • Redistribution to victims, the 7 to 8% recovered on average after the auctions, falls under the liquidation, a separate procedure. Overall, the losses are a done deal.
  • The professional standard for wealth advisers has also been set by the civil courts we saw earlier: the ten or so appeal rulings since 2019 have established the failings, and the criminal trial will not change them.
  • Lastly, the cultural and intrinsic value of the works will stay out of the debate. The court is examining financial mechanics, not literary criticism, even if whole chapters of French history are at the heart of the case.

Still, for every wealth professional, and more broadly everyone in the savings business, the lessons go beyond the Aristophil case. Standards have tightened under pressure from the regulator, civil case law and professional self-regulation.

Valuing alternative assets now requires at least two or three independent opinions, with transparent methods and recent comparables. Gaps of more than 30% trigger alerts. If the market is too narrow to provide reliable reference points, that is a signal about liquidity, not an excuse to make up prices.

The same problem arises, incidentally, for SCPIs, among other property funds. For almost 3 years, several managers have been battling with their valuers to get prices that, while they must remain consistent, don’t butcher their funds’ valuations. All this from valuers who never set foot in the buildings, and make do with cross-checking a few rows in Excel.

Better (worse?). I recently saw a fund use as its valuation method not the underlying assets (mostly listed, at that), but the price of transactions, which it therefore sets itself with its own clients (to whom it sells without a passport, the EU licence to market a fund across borders, but that will be the subject of a dedicated newsletter).

As for the liquidity Aristophil claimed, which was one of its big selling points, we know it is still a problem today. For some years, many players in unlisted assets, notably property through tokenisation and private equity through crowdfunding, have been promising liquidity through a secondary market (more or less regulated, by the way) that they do not actually control. Because no, tokenising an asset and sticking it on a blockchain does not mean anyone will want to buy it back.

More broadly, even though the rules on miscellaneous goods were strengthened by the Hamon Act of 2014, we see more and more exotic assets (watches, Pokémon cards, you name it) offered to retail investors, often the most vulnerable ones, with pitches that are sometimes downright dishonest. Admittedly, this rarely involves advisers. But it also raises questions about suitability. How many KYC questionnaires have you seen where all it takes is to click ‘OK’, like ‘Are you over 18?’ on a porn site, with a warning about overexposure?

Finally, of course, there is the eternal question of conflicts of interest.

Recently, a wealth adviser explained to me that if he were paid in fees rather than retrocessions, the commissions paid by product providers, he would no longer have any clients. That is precisely the problem.

Just as estate agents struggle to justify their fees other than by talking about their overheads, many intermediaries cannot explain why their advice has any value.

And one of the reasons is simple: it doesn’t have any.

Not because advisers are useless and can’t put together a decent allocation, but because the vast majority of advisers’ clients (or any intermediary’s)… don’t need one.

Imagine a world where you had to pay an estate agent a fee to market your property. How many clients would agree to hand over €1,000, €3,000, €5,000? Probably very few. But it would weed out the tourists, clients and agents alike. And it would give the job its value back.

Likewise, if advice can’t be priced at a few hundred or a few thousand euros, it probably isn’t useful. Because nobody needs an adviser to work out an allocation for €100K, to put €200 a month into life insurance, or to choose between Remake and Iroko, two SCPIs.

Expertise is on another level altogether.

Through free financial check-ups and retrocessions that clients rarely understand, 95% of advisers36 put themselves in a permanent conflict of interest. Admittedly, not every non-independent adviser is useless. But let’s be realistic. With highly lucrative products like SCPIs, the late Pinel buy-to-let tax break or Aristophil, which require very little work (unlike building a rental investment from scratch), how do you encourage even a minimum alignment of interests?

That said, let’s be reasonable. The Aristophil trial is first and foremost about the executives and those who covered for them. Advisers are not responsible for the fraud itself: they did not design the system, nor falsify the valuations.

But they spread the pitch without questioning it much. Just as many still spread the mirage of tax breaks with no regard for actual returns.

Still, one question is worth asking.

Would the Aristophil affair have happened with a retrocession commission of 4%?

Or better.

Would the Aristophil affair have happened in a world without retrocession commissions?