The fall of crowdfunding first freed up an entire clientele, especially in France, where real estate accounted for a huge share of the money raised. The numbers are brutal: €845M raised for real estate in 2025 across 1,004 projects, against €861M and 1,139 projects a year earlier, and a long way off the 2022 peak13. The segment now makes up only 47.9% of the sector’s inflows, which reach €1,763M across all products, after a high of €2,355M in 2022.
Money raised by crowdfunding in France
The AMF had already measured the scale of the damage, and its method is worth a look14. The regulator collected data from the 10 biggest platforms, 75% of the money raised in 2021-2023, and compared what they display with what they actually record. For projects funded in 2019, the displayed delay rate was 15.2%. Counting projects repaid late as well, and not just those still outstanding, it jumps to 60.2%. Same market, same projects, 4 times more damage depending on how you count. At 31 March 2024, about 30% of ongoing projects were running late, with the 2020 and 2021 cohorts at 20.1% and 36.9% 2 years after launch.
Real estate projects funded in 2019: the delay rate, depending on how you count
2 years later, the independent barometer kept by Argent et Salaire, which has been collecting indicators from more than 40 platforms since 2017, puts the default rate at 15.33% by value at 30 June 2026 across all debt crowdfunding, real estate, renewable energy and SMEs combined, down 11.1% over a year15. The real estate segment alone stood at 25.8% in April 2026, against 2.4% in 2022, and is above 35% on some platforms16. Not that French platforms are worse than elsewhere: real estate was simply over-represented there.
The default rate of real estate crowdfunding
But none of this applies to equity crowdfunding, even though it is sold by the same platforms, under the same licence. Not a single official figure. Just a mass grave where you have to dig up unknown soldiers’ dog tags to find out who supplied the rations. Because where debt crowdfunding publishes its default rates in the format of FPF, the French crowdfunding trade body, month after month, platform by platform, equity crowdfunding publishes nothing. No default rate, no performance, no mortality of holdings. Nowhere. But plenty of long-standing investors are watching the failures pile up. First because, mechanically, equity crowdfunding deals are worse than average (in French). Then because the market turned, stopping a lot of start-ups from refinancing and sending them to the scrapheap for lack of profitability. Then AI arrived in force, and to some extent defence, even if that remains a market of its own, changing where funds go, killing a good number of companies along the way and letting others do without outside funding for a while.
As a result, some players have specialised solely in late stage:
Other equity players have added similar offers, without making them their core business:
As have multi-product fintechs, Ramify or Cashbee.
Each tells the story in its own way, but the messaging is identical: access to investments in hard-to-reach companies. With a pitch that is, on the whole, measured.
That said, something else stands out: how similar the deals are. The easy explanation would be that companies are multiplying channels to raise money. Except that most of the deals are secondaries. Part of the answer is structural: in the first half of 2025, 5% of unicorns attracted 94% of buyer interest on the secondary market, according to Caplight19. Everyone is chasing the same twenty or so names. The other part of the answer is that a player in the shadows supplies a large share of the clubs and platforms: Maresquier Partners20, between Paris and Dubai, which could end the year with more than €200M in volume. And which, according to several consistent sources, is negotiating to buy an asset manager that already has a private equity fund. The move is far from isolated: Fundora already did the same with Kyoseil AM18. Buying a licence costs less than applying for one.
Its sales documents21 actually put what intermediation costs better than I could: the performance figures they display are presented as net for the investor, after deducting transaction fees, currency conversion costs, structuring fees and carried interest. Four line items, listed by the seller itself.
And in the middle of all this, a strange player out of nowhere.