💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 05

The Spooks

Back to our tall blond man, minus the black shoe. The company he names at the end of his video, the one that, in his words, analyses thousands of start-ups every year, is a neat palindrome: Akka.

Who is behind Akka

A company founded in 2024, 20 employees in June 2026, 3,000 investors claimed, €2.2M raised in March 2025. On the deployment side, the figures double fast: a little over €10M placed in start-ups at the end of 2025, more than €20M and more than 30 deals 6 months later22. In France, the press presents it as a French platform. In Spain, the tech press presents it as a Madrid company, founded by Thomas Rebaud and Pedro Buerbaum, run by Javier Desantes23. Industry databases, for their part, credit it with 2 CEOs: Thomas Rebaud and Nicolas Nati24.

What Akka has placed in start-ups

The company is registered with the ACPR, France’s banking supervisor, as an agent of a payment service provider (PSP), Lemonway25, and as a PSFP, a licensed crowdfunding service provider, with the AMF. The licence26, though, was issued to a company called... Blast Angels Europe. Obviously, that’s no coincidence. Blast Angels Europe is Blast Club + Europe. And Akka is the brand under which that vehicle was launched in Italy, Spain, Sweden, everywhere except France, where the club already existed under its original name. If the brand is only landing in Paris now, it is precisely because it is no longer Blast.

In the company register, the lineage is written in black and white. Blast Angels Europe was set up in 2023 by 2 shareholders: Blast Angels, with 867 of the 1,000 shares, and Blast, the company behind Blast Club, with the other 133, chaired by Thomas Rebaud27. On 29 April 2026, its sole shareholder, Blast Angels, represented by Thomas Rebaud, decided that it would henceforth be called Akka Europe28.

2023: the list of subscribers to Blast Angels Europe, certified by its chairman.

29 April 2026: Blast Angels Europe becomes Akka Europe. Signatures removed.

As for Thomas Rebaud, a former ambassador of Blast Club, he is above all the founder of Meero. A marketplace for photographers, founded in 2016, which raised €205M in June 2019 from Eurazeo Growth and Prime Ventures, the biggest round ever raised by a French start-up at the time29. The company then employed 600 people and announced it would employ 1,200 by the end of the year, for $5bn to $10bn in revenue within 7 years30. The unicorn title, on the other hand, never rested on a published figure. The valuation stayed confidential and the billion was inferred from a dilution estimated at between 20 and 25%. A year later, Rebaud told Les Échos, the French business daily, that he regretted having publicised the deal31. The regret did not survive.

Rather surprisingly, in spring 2026, and on several occasions, Akka employees denied any link with Blast Club. The app’s technical identifier on the Play Store, however, is com.capsens.blast32, named after the contractor that built the platform and the original project. On top of the licence and the obvious lineage. A package name cannot be changed after publication. It stays what it was on day one. In reality, Blast Club held around a quarter of Akka. The structure sold half its stake when a fund came into the capital, and the rest shortly before summer 2026.

A former insider sums it up:

It burns through a lot of cash and they can’t find their model, he says. It is run like a 2018 scale-up, all brute force, and he can’t see how it survives more than 1 or 2 years.
A former insider

What it costs, what it promises

The price list, close to Blast’s, is fairly simple: a subscription from €39 a month to access the deals, structuring fees of 3 to 8% on each investment, 1% annual management through the SPV (capped at 5 years), and a 15% performance fee33. The detail of the tiers is worth pausing on34.

8%

Then there are the performance figures. The website announces +33% growth in 2025, beating the S&P 500, followed by 2 words: real results. The asterisk explains that the calculation is based on the official valuations of the latest funding rounds. A last-round valuation is not a result, and certainly not a real result: it is a price at which nobody has sold. Same mechanism for the 23% average return since 1980 displayed elsewhere, by a company founded in 2024.

And in the same asterisk, in small print: start-up investments are illiquid and carry a risk of total loss. So the wording exists, and it is accurate. It lives at the bottom of the page, under a promise of growth printed in big letters. At the end of July 2026, the brand was claiming an exit on Anthropic at a 400% net return. The story fits in 3 lines: an allocation of about €690K invested, opened to the community in April 2025, sold 12 months later on the secondary market at 4x the entry price, after the structure’s fees and taxes. The figure is not absurd in itself: in April 2026, Anthropic was trading at an implied valuation of more than $1,000bn on the secondary market35, against $61.5bn at the time of entry.

Anthropic’s valuation, between the allocation’s entry and its sale

One detail is nonetheless worth setting down: Anthropic publishes on its own website a warning page about unauthorised sales of its shares, and asks to be told about anyone marketing access to its capital36.

Because the scale-up, like most of the ones used to pull in the punters, is deeply uncomfortable with these sales. At Akka, among the 28 holdings shown on the website you find Bolt, Perplexity, Crusoe, Epic Games, Anthropic: the names from the ads. And then Arpias, premium manicure subscriptions. Bund, affordable made-to-measure suits. Rhyde, refurbished scooters. Robinsun, DIY solar kits, and so on.

On the home page, the pitch comes down to 4 promises: invest like the top 1%, up to €300 free to invest, cancel any time within 30 days, and no experience needed. No experience needed, for a product whose European rules specifically require assessing the knowledge of the non-sophisticated investor and their ability to bear losses37.

And the question that applies to everyone: what exactly does the member own? On that, Akka says nothing. Not the seller’s name, not the number of vehicles stacked between them and the buyer, not the class of shares held by the SPV. Yet the platform promises VC-grade protections, anti-dilution rights included, and the same terms as the VCs34.

The touts

A story our tall blond man doesn’t tell. And he isn’t the only one. Take the prebourse Instagram/TikTok account (roughly, “pre-stock-market”), opened at the start of summer, which talks about the SpaceX IPO. And slips in, on the quiet, the name Akka.

Over the following month, the account posts 18 times. 18 times to talk about Akka and late-stage investing. Without a word about the risks. Without a word about it being advertising.

With what looks like a clear goal: recruiting.

Sometimes, other profiles comment, like startup_investfr. And what on earth could startup_investfr be talking about? You won’t believe it: late stage, and Akka.

And then there is the number of accounts that have suddenly become die-hard fans of the brand, with very understated claims:

One says he put everything in, thanks to AKKA.
Another says that apparently they all use AKKA for that, and that it’s crazy to be able to invest in Anthropic before its IPO.

Some profiles discuss the information among themselves. One of them even points out that this isn’t investment advice. After 14 videos recommending investments, including a forecast that Favikon, the French agency that produces LinkedIn top-creator rankings, will become a unicorn when it goes public.

Akka follows none of these accounts. And almost none of these accounts follow Akka. Odd, for investor-fans.

That said, Akka can be unaware neither of the campaign nor of the method, since the brand itself supplied tracked links to each of the accounts, all run, it seems, by real people producing the content they were commissioned to make. What the links tell us:

  • the campaign is mainly aimed at TikTok;
  • each account is tracked individually;
  • the word “evergreen” in the campaign UTM points to an ongoing operation;
  • the claims, templates and companies on offer are the same everywhere.

In other words, an undercover campaign, designed to stay undercover.

The claims, meanwhile, are off the planet. As here, with valuation predictions for deals offered on Akka.

Several of the influencers go as far as urging people to throw all their money at Akka:

If you have cash left at the end of the month, one of them tells viewers, whether it’s 100, 200 or 1,000 euros, put it all on Akka.

Same instruction in other videos: move all the money you have left into your AKKA account.

Some share an affiliate link.

Others prefer to go through email or private message.

Some of these touts are digital nomads struggling to sell online courses. Others are freelancers changing careers, in other words the ideal target for people who sell online courses. At least 2 have been part of an MLM.

A strange kind of astroturfing, in keeping with the rest of the story, but also with the rest of their strategy. On Instagram, for example, the akka.app account shows 12.8K followers. The account publishes AI-generated posts 3 times a day, which get between 0 and 5 likes, most of the time with no comments other than from Akka’s own account.

Asked by Zero Bullshit, Thomas Rebaud partly acknowledges the problem.

He says plenty of influencer content is not acceptable at all, and that it has been flagged, either by writing to the creators to tell them to take it down immediately, or by writing to the people (4, he believes) who were publishing content for Akka through an agency and were not following all the guidelines.
Thomas Rebaud, to Zero Bullshit

That said, the day before this answer and the publication of this newsletter, the accounts were still posting. Rebaud explains that too:

According to him, the person in charge of legal has flagged everything, and whatever is not OK at all should be removed by the end of August. […] These are small contracts, he explains: they get started, post, forget one guideline in two; Akka reviews, shuts it down, ends the collaborations or reworks them. The process was laborious at launch a few weeks ago, and things will be back in order shortly, he says.
Thomas Rebaud, to Zero Bullshit

Akka is not the only one doing this and using this agency. Digging into the profiles, other brands turn up. Like Rebind, a fintech promising 5% in euros and 8% in dollars, with instant access, which claims €36bn in deposits for 200K customers. That’s €180,000 per customer on average, at a fintech without the slightest licence or the slightest registration, with a profile that suggests the returns actually come from DeFi.

The co-founder, David Cingala, notably co-founded the web3 game Immortal Game and no doubt saw the hype around crypto savings accounts come and go. Except that if they have all disappeared, there’s a reason. The last survivor, Mon Livret C, is no longer allowed to operate for lack of a licence. All the more so as it lost several million euros almost 1 year ago and has never communicated publicly since. Before the summer, out of 6 portfolios, 4 showed a 45% loss, 1 showed 37%, and the last one, the only one in euros, 3%.

Recovery rates of the Mon Livret C portfolios after the Stream Finance hack: 55% recovered means a 45% loss.

So: risky products, sold with no disclaimer and no mention of losses, by paid accounts that never declare it.

As for Akka, the brand doesn’t rely only on anonymous accounts. Its Facebook and Instagram campaigns are still running, under its own name this time, and Meta’s ad library is public. The same pitch, the same promises of returns, and on the ads we looked at, no warning about the risk of loss.

The copy-pasted press releases

Same story, different method. In mid-June, several sites not too fussy about press releases trumpeted the offer, somewhere between copy-paste and advertorial. Jaimelesstartups rolls out the company’s arguments38:

Akka, the site writes, intends to change the game: by pooling the strength of its community and removing the complexity of investing in private markets, the start-up lets people invest on terms close to those of professionals, from €300 per deal.
Jaimelesstartups

The same day, Finyear tells the same story22, with an odd disclaimer that leaves you none the wiser as to whether or not it is an advert. Boursier and Planet Fintech carry the same quote from the CEO39:

According to the CEO, Akka changes this dynamic by pooling the power of its community and removing the operational complexity of investing in private markets.
Akka’s CEO, quoted by Planet Fintech and Boursier

Haven’t I read that somewhere? But where... In any case, the same story is doing the rounds in Polish on a local site, and in English at Il Sole 24 Ore40, almost word for word. Makes sense: Akka operates in France, Spain, Italy and Sweden, and the campaign follows the licence’s European passport. A curious detail along the way: the “CEO of Akka” who signs the quotes changes from one article to the next. Thomas Rebaud here, Nicolas Nati there.

The reviews

But hey, to find out whether Akka is really any good, you just have to look up the reviews. The Trustpilot score looks decent: 4.1. Except. Well, yes. You’ve guessed it.

The first 5 reviews are mostly bad.

Then suddenly, on 14 April 2026, shortly before the real launch in France, one Benoit Lagarde writes41:

“Part of Akka since 2025. Best decision I’ve made.”
Benoit Lagarde, on Trustpilot

He has invested in Revolut, Anthropic and 5 other early-stage start-ups. He loves the experience. He has even, he says, met the team several times, great people, very talented.

No kidding. This former Meero C-level executive is a partner and corporate officer of Akka.

12 positive reviews follow. In 2 days. All of them odd. Lucas L. and Tomas both open with how long they have been signed up, as does Adrian Søbyskogen. Who is none other than Akka’s CEO for the Nordic countries.

Further down, Marco Dos Ramos, Akka’s community manager in Spain. Markus Törstedt, from Akka Nordics. François Barone, from marketing. Daniel Garcia Reyes, sales in Spain. Salva Pérez, VC in Spain. Enough to draw a fairly safe conclusion about the nature of the remaining reviews.

5 reviews

Mostly bad.

Benoit Lagarde

“Part of Akka since 2025. Best decision I’ve made.” A partner and corporate officer of Akka.

12 positive reviews

Among their authors, Akka’s CEO for the Nordic countries, a community manager, a member of the marketing team, a salesperson.

Thomas Rebaud plays it down:

As far as Trustpilot goes, he says, this time it isn’t them. […] Akka actually wants to start putting up customer reviews to make the brand more credible when a prospect lands on the website. What is currently online, which he says he has just looked at, is not them.
Thomas Rebaud, to Zero Bullshit

Which leaves the small matter of who “them” is, then.

The licence

Then comes one last point that ought to interest the AMF far more than Trustpilot reviews. It takes 2 minutes of attention, because it’s a bit technical. But it’s interesting all the same.

A PSFP licence allows a firm to bring together project owners and investors. The project owner is the company looking for money, and the one that receives it. The 2020 European regulation was written for that, and the AMF sums it up in its own guidance: the service consists of matching investors with project owners for the purpose of financing entrepreneurs, on offers below €5M per project over 12 months42. Financing entrepreneurs. Not organising the resale of shares between shareholders.

In a secondary transaction, no entrepreneur gets financed. Anthropic receives nothing, asks for nothing, and has probably never heard of the platform selling its shares to French savers in €300 slices. Who is the project owner in this story? If it’s Anthropic, it is carrying a project without knowing it. If it’s the SPV, then the project owner is a shell created for the occasion, whose project consists of buying out someone who is leaving.

That scope is not a personal reading. The law firms that guide platforms towards a licence have all described it the same way since the text came into force: the regulation covers facilitating loans and placing securities issued by a project owner or by a special purpose entity, under a ceiling of €5M per project over 12 months, above which a prospectus becomes mandatory43. And the scope is not decorative: providing a crowdfunding service without the corresponding licence falls under Articles L. 573-12 et seq. of the French Monetary and Financial Code, in other words criminal law44.

It does allow one exception, though, and it is designed for start-ups. Putting 300 people at €300 each directly on a company’s cap table is unmanageable, so the text allows the SPV, the vehicle that groups them behind a single line. But it frames it with one condition: a single illiquid or indivisible asset per vehicle37. One SPV, one asset. And the requirement is assessed on a look-through basis, that is, by looking at what the structures this SPV controls hold, to stop a stack of shells from watering the rule down.

The whole argument therefore hangs on 2 words: illiquid asset.

ESMA, the EU markets regulator, has in fact clarified the criteria and boundaries45. An asset is illiquid when there is no organised market for that type of asset, when transactions are done over the counter, when no value is immediately available, and when agreeing a price with a buyer takes time and money.

An Anthropic share struggles to tick those boxes. Forge, Hiive and Caplight publish prices for these shares, and the secondary SpaceX price quoted earlier in this article comes from exactly there. Hard to argue that no value is available for a company whose secondary price is displayed to the dollar.

Granted. These prices are indicative, not quotes, and a transfer often requires the issuer’s consent, which it can refuse. 2 criteria lean one way, 2 the other. Practitioners have debated the classification since the text came into force, and I won’t settle it for them.

That leaves the second angle, the single vehicle. If the SPV offered to members goes into an upstream SPV that itself holds several lines, as in the 5-link chain described earlier, the look-through approach brings down the one-asset rule. How many vehicles, and what does each hold? Akka publishes that nowhere.

The other players go through a PSI or an asset manager, which bears the risk and answers for the transaction. Akka operates under its PSFP licence alone. And the AMF issued that licence knowing the model, which is not a clean bill of health but does count.

Thomas Rebaud says it is a temporary situation.

He says Akka will move towards other licences, […] a PSI licence in particular, but that the regulatory complexity of it all is pretty crazy: in reality, according to him, it is a mash-up of different regulations the firm has to get through to do exactly what it wants to do.
Thomas Rebaud, to Zero Bullshit