So what about the public money? Bpifrance is the second-largest shareholder, behind Astanor:
That leaves a few crumbs for the founders (2.92%) and various individual investors (0.66%).
So, how much?
Answer: I don’t know, but a lot.
Let’s be clear, and even if I’ll be told yet again that I don’t understand a thing, I can’t see a single way out for Ÿnsect. Some investors are pretending to believe in it, while others are starting to get genuinely annoyed off the record. Whatever happens, even if it raises €50M or €100M, given the burn and revenue that won’t really exist for many months yet, Ÿnsect will have to go through a Series E.
How can anyone imagine an investor following on after so many commercial and operational failures?
So we’ll probably see Ÿnsect’s brain-dead body dragged around the corridors of the French Tech, France’s start-up ecosystem, for a long while. But nobody is under any illusion. And a restructuring, a liquidation or a court-ordered sale could still cost the AGS, France’s wage guarantee fund, dearly to pay the 250 remaining employees.
As for the Caisse des Dépôts, apart from the €7M invested in the property company’s capital, nobody would confirm (or deny) the amounts in shareholder loans. But either way, the total exceeds €14M.
As for Bpifrance, the exact bill isn’t known. I’ve been able to trace at least €37M in bonds, but its 13.62% stake doesn’t really tell us how much it put in as equity, especially since the public body came in as early as the $15M Series B. But given the low dilution, it’s hard to imagine Bpifrance didn’t put money in at every round. According to a founder quoted by Sifted17, the bank accounted for half of the funding, probably including the convertibles.
As for the regions and local authorities, nobody wanted to answer, but in an interview the president of Amiens Métropole said he had committed to paying aid in line with the number of jobs created, and confirmed that the region had also stepped in. In 2020, the local news site Amienois-e.fr revealed that the metropolitan authority had paid out €770K in grants.18 An internal document dated 2018 mentions, without giving an amount, support from the metropolitan authority, but also from the local chamber of commerce, the Hauts-de-France region and the département council. It then raises the possibility of applying for reindustrialisation aid or the Prime à l’aménagement du territoire (PAT), a regional development grant, both awarded by the state. Or for revitalisation funds (private money from local redundancy plans).
Someone close to the département mentions a €440K grant from the département council at the end of 2020. An internal source talks of €1.54M for the département and the metropolitan authority combined, part of it conditional on job creation. Only €231K per backer was reportedly released in 2020, then €132K in 2021 for the département council.
When it set up in Dole, Ÿnsect benefited from the Programme d’investissements d’avenir (PIA), France’s state “investments for the future” programme. Although the amount wasn’t disclosed, the Amiens project is announced there for 2020, and the start-up is the poster child of the 2019 report19, whose effectiveness the Cour des comptes, France’s national audit office, had sharply criticised. For the same project, Ÿnsect had received €500K under the PAT in 2015.20 The same PAT shows up in the 2018 and 2019 accounts at €200K each time, then €500K in 2020.
According to my information, the total aid received under the PIA comes to around €21.3M.
At European level, a €20M grant was awarded at the time of the Series C in 201921, under the BBI JU (Bio Based Industries Joint Undertaking).
There are also traces of funding from Paris Innovation Amorçage, a Paris seed fund, the Jeune Entreprise Innovante status, France’s tax break for young innovative companies, a Zelcor grant from INRAE, France’s national agricultural research institute (€400K in 2019, €30K in 2018), from Ademe (€82K in 2018, a €1.6M advance in 2017), from the ANR, France’s national research agency (€60K), hiring subsidies (€69K in 2021), Bpifrance again (€243K in 2021) and the CICE, a French payroll tax credit (€118K in 2019, €118K in 2018, €93K in 2017, €49K in 2016).
In 2015, grants came to €760K against €8K in revenue.
€670K against €20K in revenue in 2016
€133K against €37K in revenue in 2017
€190K against €85K in revenue in 2018
€55K against €136K in revenue in 2019
€962K against €211K in revenue in 2020
€445K against €354K in revenue in 2021
€589K against €593K in revenue in 2022
€1.6M against €656K in revenue in 2023
And in reality, the sheer number of sources and the complexity of the balance sheets mean it is probably far more, with the EU grant, for example, never showing up in the figures.
All that, then, for a company that has made barely €2M in revenue in 10 years.
Adding up grants, equity and unrepaid state-guaranteed loans, the bill for the public purse should therefore come to somewhere between €250M and €300M.
That’s pricey for creating 250 jobs that are about to disappear.
And posting a bakery’s turnover.22
So yes, obviously, it’s simplistic.
Yes, obviously, you can’t make revenue when your plant opens in early 2024 and has to wait a year to reach 20% of its production capacity.
Yes, obviously, an industrial company’s capex isn’t that of a SaaS whose funding round only serves to hand cash to Google and Facebook.
But the question still has to be asked.
How long should we keep a company on life support when it can’t produce?
How much does it cost, and who should pay?
Public money can (should?) be used to fund bets, even if they fail. That’s the case with Mistral, the French AI start-up: if we don’t put the money in today, even for nothing, we miss the chance to exist in that field for 10, 20 or 30 years.
But it can’t be done at any price, nor defended by elected officials who don’t understand any of it.
You can’t justify colossal spending in the name of supposedly saving jobs when each job costs more than a million euros of public money.
You can’t keep a company on a drip of tens of millions of euros just because you can’t stomach a loss.
Public money is a common good.
Every euro should be justified, and how it is used measured.
You can get it wrong.
But not 1,000 times.
My name is Benjamin Charles, and I do branding, positioning and content creation consulting for companies in finance, property and web3.
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