💥 Zero Bullshit
Epilogue

Lost Highway

In the end, the story of Victor Lora and Fire NFT is staggeringly banal. It’s just the nonsense posted every day on TikTok or Instagram, except that he actually put it into practice. And after failing, he started selling his (botched) method so others can do the same.

And all of it without the slightest consequence, even though it could well be sanctioned by regulators.

On the risks

Rereading the many, many communications, neither Fire nor Lora ever mentions the risks. Never. Not once.

Email sent to retail investors for the second deal of Kirpi I

Not even in 2025, after losing investors more than €1M. Not even after our long conversation in which I raised that precise point.

A few days ago, Lora sent out, through the Fire newsletter, an encouragement to take over companies27, since that’s one of his courses. Nothing is mentioned.

  • Not the risk of losing capital;
  • Not the risks of bank leverage;
  • Not the risks of illiquidity;
  • And even less the fact that he is giving advice on doing the very thing he failed at.

No mention either the day before, when he explains that he can get you up to €16K a month28

Nothing.

Ever.

On the management

In their communications, Lora and Boulanger repeatedly mention their experience in start-ups, finance and M&A to reassure investors. But above all, the wording used, both in the marketing material29 and in the contracts, is very clear:

  • The companies are described as the funds’ manager (gérant, gestionnaire);
  • They say unambiguously that they manage the funds and the portfolios;
  • They collect the money from the companies.

So yes, back then, people did royalties while hunting for exemptions from the public offering rules30.

The problem is that article L548-1 of France’s Monetary and Financial Code is clear: Fire Invest acted (at the very least) as a crowdfunding intermediary.

Under that article, crowdfunding intermediation consists of connecting, by means of a website, the backers of a specific project and the people financing that project […]

This isn’t a royalty contract of the licence kind, on a franchise or on copyright. It is quite obviously a financial product:

  • Because there is a promised return;
  • Because the funds are actively managed;
  • Because investors have no control over the management.

Victor Lora defends himself, saying a lawyer had approved the structure and that it was similar to Bricks. Except that the AMF publicly disowned Bricks on this very point, and the platform changed its model to fit the mould of a licensed crowdfunding service provider, a PSFP.

But above all, it would seem that this isn’t a contract like Bricks’, but a botched copy-and-paste of Bricks’ contracts.

Royalty contract from Fire NFT

Royalty contract from Bricks for a 2021 deal

So you might wonder whether a lawyer really wrote and approved this contract, by nicking the ones already written by Bricks. There is every reason to doubt that a specialist lawyer, to use Victor Lora’s words, would have kept the term manager (gestionnaire) for funds, and would have used regulated (or near-regulated) terms such as portfolio.

Especially since Bricks was in a very dark grey area, but a fairly readable one: for each investment, one contract, tied to one property, managed by Bricks.

In Fire’s case, people wire their money without knowing how it will be used. In this instance:

  • We’re talking about several hundred retail investors;
  • Investing in an undefined project;
  • With governance neither agreed nor set;
  • With third-party managers involved.

The big compliance nerds will obviously have worked out where I’m going: this obviously doesn’t fit the framework of a royalty contract, but it doesn’t fit that of a club deal either, in the terms of the AMF sanction against Eternam31.

This is an obvious case of an AIF32 that should have been declared as an ‘other AIF’ (Autre FIA), managed by an AMF-licensed asset management company and given a depositary, which would incidentally have prevented the whole mess, since it would have spotted the problems immediately.

  • Which plainly amounts to the illegal management of collective investment undertakings33;
  • On top of the string of problematic marketing material on returns and above all on risks;
  • The failure to manage obvious conflicts of interest;
  • The illegal practice of property management and property intermediation.

It remains to be seen what will come of it. I’ll stake three FTX tokens on ‘nothing’.

  • The AMF and the ACPR, France’s banking and insurance supervisor, will reply that this isn’t a regulated player, and so they have no jurisdiction;
  • The DGCCRF, France’s consumer protection authority, will probably say nothing at all, preferring to go after the big influencers.

And that’s where we are.

Every day, there are scamfluencers who ‘forget’ to say they are paid (in cash, in affiliate fees, in kind) to talk about this or that product. Or who promote risky or complex products without the slightest warning.

Case in point: barely a few days after its sanction, notably over misleading marketing communications, Altaroc was treating itself to a disguised advert on Racem Flazi’s podcast. In the post, deleted after I commented on it, Altaroc’s latest private equity fund, Odyssée, was promoted without any advertising disclosure, without any mention of the risks, and with the famous 13% figure supposedly the average return of private equity. Even though Altaroc has never published its own returns.

On YouTube too, there was never any mention of risk or of advertising34.

Sometimes you think the regulators are less scary than the bogeyman.