In the start-up market specifically, these figures give you an idea of a company’s real financial situation.

Before the summer, I told the story of Nanaba, a company that hasn’t paid its staff since January. Nor its creditors. Its boss, Olivier Guérin, told me at the time that a start-up wasn’t a company like any other. Before reeling off the usual clichés about the adventure, the experience, and therefore the risks that come with it. But how is an employee supposed to gauge the risk of a company whose finances they know nothing about? Since it was founded, Nanaba has never filed its accounts. And despite 6 months of unpaid wages, 1 missed payment to MyOptions and 2 to Bpifrance, the French public investment bank, the company still isn’t in receivership.

Read also: “Nanaba : une start-up pavée de bonnes intentions” [Nanaba: a start-up paved with good intentions] (in French)

Plenty of start-ups run very aggressive models, designed to kill off a market and end up in a winner takes it all situation. That’s what happened to Luko, the home insurance start-up, which pushed market prices upwards (and UX upwards too) on the back of a model that was not financially sustainable.

For example, reading the balance sheet of Bricks, showing a €2.1M loss, you learn that the property crowdfunding platform has financial fixed assets of €1,028,501. According to my information, this is explained by financing a building in Belfort, a town in eastern France, out of its own funds, to top up a fundraising round that wasn’t taking off.

Some put forward the argument of confidentiality, as Charline Perreau points out. And yet, in the same way that I find it interesting to see that Lactalis enjoys a fat margin by buying its milk below the average market price, it’s instructive to see whether a start-up’s aggressive pricing model actually generates revenue.