💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

The Capimmo equation

Back to Primonial, which presents Capimmo as diversified property made accessible through life insurance. Among the arguments set out on the manager’s website:

  • Risk pooling: there are lots of properties, so you are less exposed if one asset runs into trouble
  • A limited outlay: from a few thousand euros
  • A track record: 264 investments
  • An experienced team
  • A liquidity pocket: according to the site, at least 5%, up to 35% in listed property companies and directly held property, and 60% to 90% in unlisted collective property.

That liquidity is not guaranteed.

Primonial says so in the small print nobody reads. In fact, nobody reads it so thoroughly that nobody at Primonial noticed the last risk was pasted in without being formatted. 🥲

In Q1 2023, Capimmo reported tiny net inflows of €30M and said it had €300M to invest, and €375M available to provide liquidity. Performance stood at -1.32%, for €7.35bn of assets and a NAV of €289.60.

At the time, the management report described the fall as very limited compared with how markets had moved, and as temporary in view of the fund’s own management prospects.

In Q2, YtD performance dropped to -1.82%, net assets had melted to €7bn, and the NAV stood at €288.13. The liquidity pocket rose to 9%, against 8.1% in Q1. The manager still talks of an exceptional performance.

What has happened since? No idea.

All we know, for instance, is that exposure to SCPIs and OPCIs (another type of French property fund) went from 15.5% (€1.13bn) to 15.1% (€1bn). These transactions obviously raise questions, because it looks fairly obvious that Primonial invests in its own SCPIs and OPCIs… and vice versa.

Case in point: Capimmo… sits on the supervisory board of Patrimmo, an SCPI from the same group, and sat on that of Primopierre for 4 years in a row.

On 28 August, after heavy net outflows from life insurance (€1.6bn in H1), Primonial REIM warned its 15 distributing insurers that liquidity could not be guaranteed beyond a billion euros of withdrawals. According to one insurer I spoke to, the SCI had already gone through almost 10% of liquidity over the summer.

The news was picked up a week later, and savers started to get nervous, raising fears of FUD2 and therefore a contagion of withdrawals.

A few days later, its NAV showed -12% (a loss of €700M-€750M for savers), and articles and comments questioned the disposal plan negotiated between Primonial and the insurers.

In short: the insurers allegedly dipped into savers’ money to secure their own liquidity.