After months of silent agony and public denials, Saks Global announced a $1.75bn financing package to get through Chapter 11. $1bn comes from existing bondholders, $500M will be available on exit from bankruptcy, and $240M comes from the ABL (asset-based lending) lenders.

But the clock is ticking. The TopCo Debt matures in twenty days. And the former Neiman shareholders, who hold that debt, have no reason to be patient.

Even before the bankruptcy, Saks had started selling the family silver. In December 2025, Neiman sold its minority stake in Fashionphile, the second-hand luxury resale platform.⁶³ A fire sale of assets, a month before Chapter 11.

In his first letter to suppliers, van Raemdonck promises that future invoices will be paid, that arrears will be a priority, and that the company will emerge as a stronger business later this year. That will mean closing stores. WWD reported that at least 20 closures were being considered. The reality on day one of the bankruptcy: 26 leases rejected in one go.

The list is telling. They are mostly former Lord & Taylor stores that Baker had converted into Saks OFF 5TH, in Simon Property Group malls. A heavy concentration on the East Coast, with a few sites in New England and the Midwest.⁶⁴

And one surprise: San Francisco, 384 Post Street, Union Square. The Saks West Coast flagship. Lease signed in 1991, thirty-five years of history. Over.⁶⁵ On a street where half the ground-floor units stand empty, between a Bulgari and a Chanel. Where even H&M has left the area.

This is only the first wave. The filings mention more closures to come. The Manhattan and Beverly Hills flagships should survive. The rest, less certain.

But beyond the financial restructuring, beyond the closures and the negotiations with creditors, a more fundamental question arises: does the multi-brand luxury department store still have a future?

Obviously, the story strikes a nerve in France, when you think back to businessman Michel Ohayon’s woes with the regional Galeries Lafayette stores he took over, the closures of Printemps stores outside Paris (Galeries Lafayette and Printemps being France’s two great department-store names), or the ones waiting for Frédéric Merlin just around the corner. In London, Debenhams was liquidated in 2021, House of Fraser has been decimated, and even Selfridges and Harrods are racking up losses. In Germany, Galeria Kaufhof, the one deal where Baker made money, sold just in time in 2019, has gone bust three times since. The model is cracking everywhere.

If Saks goes further down the concession route, it will have to focus on big cities, where there is enough footfall to make the shops-in-shop pay. Goodbye to secondary locations. Goodbye to peripheral markets.

And if Saks sticks with wholesale, it will have to take fewer risks, buy less merchandise and accept more markdowns. Goodbye to the temple of luxury where everything is available. Goodbye to the unlimited shopping experience.

Either way, it will be a diminished version of what Saks and Neiman Marcus stood for at their peak. The fact remains: the story of two weakened retailers that merge and find success simply doesn’t exist.

355 years of history for Hudson’s Bay.
101 years for Saks Fifth Avenue.
Thirteen months for Saks Global.

The Titanic of department stores has found its iceberg.