💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 03

1️⃣ Buyers who can afford less and less

A third of French people have a loan on their main home, a figure that is stable over time. As is the 58% share of homeowners.2 Between 2017 and 2021, 86% of purchases were made with a mortgage.3

Credit is therefore one of the engines of the property market

We saw in an earlier chart that:

  • Transaction volume is correlated with lending volume
  • Lending volume is correlated with the average rate

But…

Cum hoc ergo propter hoc

For those who skipped Latin, this phrase names a fallacy and literally means “with this, therefore because of this”. In reality, this storks-deliver-babies kind of correlation is misleading and proves nothing.

Take Patrick and Isabelle, who want to buy a flat in Levallois-Perret, just outside Paris. Their (perfectly honest) income lets them pay €1,500 a month: how much they can borrow changes with the rate.

  • €230,000 in 2008 (4.85%)
  • €325,000 in 2021 (1.06%)

That’s a 41.3% difference for a rate cut of 3.79 points (-78%).

Rates that go beyond the French market

To understand why rates move, you have to look at our monetary policy.

Here, it’s the European Central Bank (ECB) that handles the whole shebang. It has 3 so-called conventional tools:

  • Open-market operations: the ECB steps into the interbank markets to buy and sell government bonds. 👉 This creates more or less liquidity and moves prices (and therefore yields)
  • Reserve requirements: the funds a bank must hold back. 👉 The more the ECB raises them, the more funds banks must keep, so the less they lend. And vice versa.
  • Key interest rates: the cost of borrowing from and depositing with the ECB. 👉 The more expensive it is for banks to borrow, the more expensive loans get, the less the economy invests, so it slows down.

I’m keeping it short, but that’s the idea.

Under a principle laid down by Jan Tinbergen (nobody’s fool: he won the Nobel prize in economics in 1969): one instrument should serve one objective.

With this whole contraption, the ECB has to fulfil its mission, namely

  • Economic growth
  • Employment
  • Rate stability
  • Domestic balance

Doesn’t look that complicated, does it? 🙄

Except that Nicholas Kaldor (no Nobel, but no less brilliant) showed that these 4 objectives were in fact at odds with each other.

And now you start to see the story: since there’s no perfect equation, and 350M of us use the euro every day, in 20 different countries, it’s hard to have an answer to everything.

So what does this have to do with mortgages?

A story of inflation…

In the summer of 2021, inflation went above 3%. A first in 10 years.

Why? Now that’s a big question. There are plenty of short-term explanations, including:

  • A rapid post-Covid rebound in consumption, with production unable to keep up
  • The war in Ukraine putting pressure on food and energy

Others point to monetary policy.

Because while we were talking about conventional policies earlier, there are also unconventional ones: including quantitative easing. It’s a bit like open-market operations, but on the financial markets, and for more or less any bond.

For #TeamMiltonFriedman (another economics Nobel), inflation is purely monetary: central banks pour out money on a massive scale while too little wealth is created. That was the case in Germany in 1923, when people bought their bread with billions of marks.

Historians and economists will settle it (or not): either way, inflation is soaring.

So the ECB looks at the 3 buttons at its disposal: it raises rates.

Having dropped below 1% in 2012, they had been at 0% since 2016, an economic anomaly. But the successive crises (subprime, then the Greek and Spanish debt crises) had pushed the ECB to keep rates low: when credit is cheap, people spend. As demand rises, prices rise. And once again we run into Kaldor’s triangle.

The fact remains that:

  • When inflation arrives (or might): the ECB raises its rates
  • To revive growth: the ECB cuts its rates
  • And these rates have a direct impact on mortgage rates (even if they go up faster than they come down) 👉 this time, it’s causation

Usury rate: the vice tightens 🤡

To stop borrowers paying too much, the French state sets a usury rate. That is, the maximum rate (insurance included) a bank may offer. It is calculated quarterly: average rate + 33%.

Inevitably, when rates rise fast, the calculation can’t keep up.

In the summer of 2021, mortgage brokers started to feel the wind turning: lending was beginning to shrink. According to them, with the usury rate not rising fast enough, some borrowers would soon find themselves above it: something no study has ever confirmed.

That said, you can clearly see that as soon as the average rate gets close to the usury rate (the delta curve), lending drops: which seems fairly consistent, since some of the weaker applications can no longer be financed.

At the time, I warned about the industry’s noisy lobbying: letting the usury rate rise quickly mostly means letting rates rise a lot. Indeed, once the usury rate started being calculated monthly: the more it rose… the more it rose. And it never managed to boost lending.

So fewer people can get financing

But what if the problem lay elsewhere? Lending professionals assume they are indispensable. That the market is stalling because they are lending less.

They should reread that pretentious Latin quote: what if they were the consequence and not the cause?