💥 Zero Bullshit
Epilogue

The architecture of a lie

These flaws don’t only harm individual investors, but the credibility and viability of the entire bond crowdfunding sector. Without structural reform, a whole promising branch of alternative finance risks collapsing under its own legal contradictions.

If all this is very confusing and very complex, it’s quite simply because, as I’ve been saying for nearly 3 years: this whole PSFP thing is a huge nonsense that causes more problems than it solves:

  • By putting the platform in a huge conflict of interest, where it is paid on the money raised, with no incentive to offer good projects;
  • By leaving the players to run their own wind-down procedures without the slightest oversight;
  • By never stepping in on misleading, even deceptive, marketing that sometimes played down the risks and sometimes passed property crowdfunding off as an investment in property, when it is lending to small businesses;
  • By offering no framework for fractional property investment, which “makes do” by more or less getting round an ill-suited regulation;
  • By lumping financial assets together (bonds and equity in particular), when even if the fundraising method is the same, the stakes, the risks and how to assess them have nothing in common;
  • By authorising, even promoting, the concept of the SPV, which had long been abandoned;
  • By allowing crazy piles of fees, sometimes on the project owners’ side, sometimes on the investors’ side, making the real risks extremely hard to read.

In the middle of all this, the platforms’ lobby, Financement Participatif France, which recently joined France Fintech, has badly failed in its mission.

  • By being unable to make its members display performance indicators;
  • By publishing indicators by year, in large numbers, unreadable for the general public, with total opacity on how the figures change;
  • By refusing to clarify the specific issue of fractional property investment;
  • By being unable to find a way of presenting the results of equity crowdfunding;
  • By letting aggressive, misleading and deceptive marketing proliferate, which pushed the very real risks into the background;
  • By accepting a common status for all platforms, even though their businesses were different;
  • By never clearly putting on the table the mismatch between the regulatory frameworks and the activities involved.

But luckily the regulators are going to bang their fists on the table and hand down sanctions, forcing everyone responsible to face up to their responsibility.

Just kidding.
Obviously not.

Because as usual, the regulations were mainly written to protect those who write them. Granted, some managers have already been sanctioned for breaches, I’ve talked about it several times in relation to SCPIs. But those companies, broadly serious despite a few abuses, still exist.

The AMF is currently investigating. The reports will come out in 1 or 2 years, possibly jointly with other regulators. The sanctions, if there are any, will come in 2 or 3 years. The companies will no longer exist. There won’t be a single euro left to go after. And most of the owners won’t have lost a thing. It wasn’t their money on the line.

This situation calls for an urgent reform of the PSFP legal framework.

  • Mandatory independence: require the appointment of a bondholders’ representative who is totally independent of the platform.
  • Clarified liability: strengthen the duty to provide information upfront, with clear liability for PSFP platforms, opening the way to individual actions in the event of a breach.
  • Separation of powers: clearly separate the functions of selection, marketing and representation.
  • Stronger procedural oversight: make audits systematic on whether platforms follow issuing procedures, notably regarding certificates of deposit of funds and compliance with the announced legal structures.
  • Communication about risks: require platforms to explain clearly what investors are investing in, and the risks they are exposed to, and sanction risks that are hidden or kept far from the promises.

Crowdfunding certainly isn’t dead. Some keep raising money, and even posting fine performances.

  • Enerfip
  • Bienprêter
  • Lendopolis
  • Lendosphere
  • And perhaps a few other, smaller players

Consider this investment advice (or not) if you like. And there’s no question of pillorying every platform that, like La Première Brique, has suffered losses (or soon will). That’s normal. A risk-free investment at 10% doesn’t exist. But if some have losses below 5% and others above 20%, it’s no coincidence. Just as it’s no coincidence that the SCPIs that crashed in 2023-2025 belong to the same managers, and are the ones that raised the most.

And just as a good number of CGPs bear a huge share of responsibility for selling crap to gorge themselves on commissions, those who promoted crap platforms, pseudo-analysing crap projects to pocket (crap) commissions, should also take a hard look at themselves.

But once again, no conclusion. Just the same observation. Once again.

Ever since I started writing, I’ve covered subjects that expose problems, whereas my job for 18 years has been to bring solutions to my clients.

That’s why I recently started working with a partner that supports and finances complex financial, wealth or family disputes, within a structure that brings together a pool of experts (including me), backed by a group with more than €100M in capital.

To be clear: if you have a complex financial dispute that could turn out long and costly, we can look into it, and we only get paid if we win.

My name is Benjamin Charles, and I advise finance, property and web3 companies on branding, positioning and content creation.

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