While the Brazilian courts look for Coustet without finding him, he has already turned the page. With Lenoël, he launches the first hotel club deals on the French Riviera through SantaREIM. Alongside that, he runs EDGE Gestion in Cannes with his son Jules, and remains manager of Arpoador Finance and Bahia Finance, two companies whose names betray, like SantaREIM itself, a lasting attachment to Brazil.
As told in episode 1, SantaREIM sells hotel club deals promising a 12% IRR on 3-star hotels in provincial France. The model rests on buying the building and the business at the same time, with an operator in place. It is a different structure from the condo-hotel Coustet operated in Brazil, where individual investors bought rooms one by one. But in both cases, the sales pitch is the same: the managers’ credibility. In finance, everything rests on trust. More than an IRR, more than a loss or a gain. Trust sometimes comes from a track record. But in our line of work, it more often comes from reputation, the CV, and above all from what we project through the halo effect: a spell at the ENA, a post at Matignon, the Prime Minister’s office, a chief executive’s title are enough to reassure an investor who will not check the detail.
And it is precisely this credibility that is the problem. Coustet’s hotel CV rests on B&B Hotels Brasil, on the Casa Mosquito through his Luxembourg co-investments, and on his joint ventures with Hottinguer in Brazil. We have seen what is left of them: a hotel whose owners were dispossessed, an institutional investor that was never repaid, companies dissolved irregularly, and courts that cannot find him. At B&B, investors in the São Paulo condo-hotel had signed collective investment contracts on the promise of a return independent of the hotel’s performance⁴⁹ᶜ. In 2020, Coustet signed an amendment suspending the fixed rent and shifting the operating risk onto those same investors, exactly what the contract was supposed to prevent.
As for Lenoël, episode 1 told the story of his career at Antin Vendôme, UFFI and Fiducial, where investors in SCPIs, France’s retail property funds, voted several times to get rid of the management company he ran, then at APICAP, sanctioned by the AMF and wound up.
That is the track record Coustet and Lenoël bring to SantaREIM today. The facts are there: Athos Capital Partners was dissolved irregularly with federal tax debts⁵⁶ᵍ, a criminal investigation for misappropriation is under way⁵⁶ʰ, and Coustet did not wait to settle his Brazilian affairs before launching new ones in France.
Granted, SantaREIM, unlike some others, does not use this storytelling to pick the pockets of retail investors who lack the tools to understand what they are being told. And indeed, an investigation is not a conviction. But several SantaREIM projects, from a firm that says it is regulated by the AMF, have been indirectly financed with public money, through the Fonds Tourisme Côte d’Azur, a regional tourism fund backed by the Caisse d’Épargne Côte d’Azur savings bank, the Nice chamber of commerce, the Nice metropolitan authority and the European Investment Bank.
This is not the story of two crooks. It may be worse. It is the story of a system that doesn’t look. That doesn’t ask questions. That takes CVs at face value, titles as guarantees, and promises as proof. A system where you can lose people along the way, dissolve companies without paying your debts, escape the courts of one country, and start again in another with the same words, the same slides, the same self-assurance. Not because you are particularly clever, but because nobody checks. Because checking is expensive, slow, and earns nothing.
At the start of this episode, I wrote that money is neither good nor bad, neither clean nor dirty, and that what counts is what you do with it. There is one thing people often forget in finance. Behind the IRRs, the AUM, the club deals and the twelve-slide PowerPoints, there are people. People who sign a cheque because they believe a promise. People who stake €500 on a crowdfunding project, when it was months of savings. People who spend ten years building a hotel by hand, permit by permit, morning by morning, and who watch it vanish into a line in a companies register. People who never get over it.
Louis is dead. Benjamin is still in Rio, a few streets from the hotel he built. Guilherme was 21.
When contacted, neither Olivier Coustet, nor Patrick Lenoël, nor GAI wished to respond.
Olivier Coustet remains presumed innocent of the facts, neither established nor specified, of the criminal investigation opened against him, as well as in the proceedings that have not, or not yet, reached a conclusion. This article does not aim to seek or prove any guilt, actual or possible.
Olivier Coustet has never been implicated, directly or indirectly, in the Mensalão scandal.