💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 01

Once upon a time

In the first episode of this series, published last November, we told the story of the long drift of Apicap, the fall of Patrick Lenoël and the birth of SantaREIM Partners, a new asset manager with no licence from the AMF, France’s financial markets regulator, which sells hotel club deals (private deals pooling a small group of investors) promising a 12% IRR on 3-star hotels in provincial France. We left readers with a promise: to tell the story of the Brazilian dealings of Olivier Coustet, co-founder of SantaREIM. And why they raise a serious question about his fitness and propriety.

Here we are.

Because to understand SantaREIM, running through Coustet’s CV is not enough. You have to go to Brazil. Via Luxembourg, without stopping. Nobody stops in Luxembourg. It’s an address on a register, a registry that stamps, a letterbox in a soulless street. The money passes through, the decisions are taken elsewhere.

In the first episode, we barely skimmed Coustet’s career. A few lines. This time, we dig. Olivier Coustet, born in 1964 in Ruffec, in the Charente, has the flawless career of the French senior civil service. Sciences Po, a postgraduate degree in banking and finance at Dauphine university in Paris, an MSc in Finance at the London School of Economics, the ENA1 (in the class named after Condorcet2), then four years at the Inspection générale des finances, the finance ministry’s elite audit corps, known as the IGF. The Condorcet class is the class of Valérie Pécresse (ranked 2nd), now a leading conservative politician, but also of Gilles Grapinet, who went into the IGF the same year as Coustet, on the same day, under the same order of 17 February 19923. Remember that name.

On graduating, he heads to Crédit commercial de France as deputy director of international financing, then leaves for São Paulo in 1998 as company secretary of the CCF group. CCF, founded in 1894, was France’s sixth-largest bank, privatised after President Mitterrand’s nationalisations. At its head since 1987: Charles-Henri Filippi, another finance inspector, who had graduated top of his ENA class thirteen years earlier, and future chairman and CEO of HSBC France. Coustet is sent to Brazil just as the takeover talks are speeding up. In July 2000, HSBC swallows CCF for €11bn. The Brazilian group comes under the British flag. Coustet heads back to Paris.

He becomes chief financial officer of Europe 1 Communication, the radio group, and of the digital arm of Lagardère Médias. He arrives just in time for the fireworks. In October 2000, Lagardère SCA restructures its entire broadcasting division: Europe 1 Communication and Lagardère Net are merged under the Lagardère Active brand. It is the height of the dotcom bubble. The group launches digital channels left, right and centre: Match TV, Gourmet TV, Forum Planète. They will all close between 2002 and 2005. Coustet won’t be there to see the wreckage: he has already left, in 2001.

In May 2002, as soon as President Chirac is re-elected, he joins the private office of Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin as technical adviser in charge of urban affairs, housing, tourism, sport and the voluntary sector4. The chief of staff is Pierre Steinmetz, a former prefect and former head of the Gendarmerie nationale, France’s military police force. And among the advisers, in charge of economic affairs: Gilles Grapinet, the classmate who went into the IGF on the same day as Coustet ten years earlier. The world of France’s senior civil service is a small village. Coustet stays until November 20045, replaced by Alain Resplandy-Bernard, an ENA graduate from the Cour des comptes, the national audit office, who would go on to a career at the CNRS, the national scientific research centre, at Thalès, at the PMU, the horse-racing betting operator, then at the state property directorate, before taking charge of SNCF Gares & Connexions, the railway stations arm of the national rail operator, in autumn 2025.

Then back to Brazil. At the end of 2004, Coustet is sent to Brasília as executive director of Caixa Seguros, the insurance subsidiary of the state-owned bank Caixa Econômica Federal, 51.75% owned by the French insurer CNP Assurances. The man running CNP’s international business since joining its management board in 2003 is Xavier Larnaudie-Eiffel, an ENA graduate from the d’Aguesseau class, the same as Patrick Lenoël, who worked at the Treasury, within the finance ministry, in the same years as Coustet6. The management board of the Brazilian subsidiary is chaired by Thierry Claudon, a CNP executive in post since 2001, who would stay sixteen years. Coustet, for his part, does not stay long. In August 2006, a Brazilian government press release announces him as the future head of the office of the Agence Française de Développement7, France’s development agency, due to open in Rio in January 2007. But in January 2007, it is in Paris that he turns up, appointed chief executive of AFER. He never mentions the AFD job anywhere. Nor Caixa Seguros. On his LinkedIn profile, a gap of almost two years separates his departure from the Prime Minister’s office (which he dates to 2005) from his arrival at AFER.

It has to be said that Coustet’s time at Caixa Seguros left some embarrassing traces. In September 2005, the political columnist Cláudio Humberto reported in the Folha de Londrina8 that the French from CNP, on an inspection visit to Caixa Seguros, had declared themselves “satisfeitos com os resultados, mas preocupados”: satisfied with the results, but worried. Worried because, according to the columnist:

Coustet “se cacifou para ser diretor da empresa com a ajuda dos fios desencapados Delúbio Soares e Felipe Belisário Wermus (vulgo ‘Luís Favre’)”.

In other words: he allegedly got the job through the string-pulling of Delúbio Soares and Luís Favre.

In Brazil, those two names do not go unnoticed. Delúbio Soares was the national treasurer of the PT, Lula’s Workers’ Party, the man who would be sentenced in 2012 to almost nine years in prison for active corruption in the Mensalão scandal, the biggest scheme for buying parliamentary votes in the country’s history. In September 2005, he had just been expelled from the PT. As for Favre, whose real name is Felipe Belisário Wermus, he is a French-Argentine activist, a former Trotskyist who passed through the Fourth International in Paris, became the PT’s international adviser, and is the ex-husband of Marta Suplicy, the PT mayor of São Paulo. In 2007, he would himself be suspected of running offshore accounts to fill the party’s coffers. And Caixa Econômica Federal, the state bank that was CNP’s partner in Caixa Seguros, was itself accused of serving as a channel for diverting money to the party9. This was the climate in which Coustet was coordinating French investment in Brazilian insurance. It’s easier to see why this chapter appears on no CV.

So in January 2007, he is appointed chief executive of AFER. Which, put like that, looks like a promotion. In reality, if AFER had never needed a chief executive in thirty years of existence, it was because its two founders ran everything. And because they had just been convicted of breach of trust. He would stay only sixteen months, until April 2008.

AFER is the Association Française d’Épargne et de Retraite, a savers’ association. Founded in 1976 by Gérard Athias and André Le Saux, its idea was simple and, at the time, revolutionary: bring individual savers together in a non-profit association to negotiate, collectively, a life insurance savings contract (France’s favourite savings product) with a partner insurer. Fees go down, returns go up, everyone wins. Except the insurer, which wins too, but less. AFER imposes free top-ups, free withdrawals, and an end to commissions deducted upfront. The whole life insurance market ends up following suit. Today: 760,000 members, €55bn of savings under management, a partnership with Abeille Assurances (formerly Aviva, formerly L’Abeille), and day-to-day management by a joint grouping in which both sides have equal seats10.

Except that at the end of 1986, Athias and Le Saux decide to help themselves. With the agreement of the insurer Abeille Vie, they quietly set up SNC Sinafer, a brokerage firm whose status as a general partnership exempts it from publishing accounts11. Attached to it is an undisclosed partnership, SEP Sinafer, which they own 90% of. The mechanics are classic and the execution cynical: part of the commissions taken on the contracts of the 360,000 members flows through the SNC, up into the SEP, and ends up in the pockets of Athias and Le Saux. For eleven years12. €129M siphoned off in total13.

The scheme is exposed in 2000 by the broker François Nocaudie. Athias and Le Saux are placed under formal investigation. Athias resigns as chairman. Five chairmen follow one another between 2001 and 200514. It is chaos. In 2008, the Paris court of appeal gives them two-year suspended sentences, fines of €200K each, and the confiscation of €92M15. Their final appeal is dismissed in December 2009. Both died in 2016, without ever spending a day in prison.

That is the backdrop when Coustet lands in January 2007. The first chief executive in the association’s history. The person who hired him was its chair, Bénédicte Coste, granddaughter of General Leclerc, the Second World War commander, an HEC business school graduate and a wealth manager. She was looking for a credible profile to lobby the authorities. The trade press hailed the arrival of a heavyweight, chosen for his time at CNP Assurances and his role as technical adviser in Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s private office16. In other words: it was less his results that opened the door than his address book.

The same year, Gérard Bekerman takes over as chair and creates a Committee of Elders to keep watch over the association’s ethics. Among the elders appointed: Pierre Steinmetz. The same Steinmetz who had been Coustet’s direct boss at the Prime Minister’s office five years earlier. The same one who still sits on it today. It’s a small world. But the networks are big.

Coustet stays only sixteen months, until April 2008. Why he leaves, we don’t know exactly. What we do know is that he leaves behind him a radioactive Brazil and an AFER under reconstruction, and that he lands at a friend’s.

In September 2009, Coustet joins Alfina as chief executive17. Alfina is the financial advisory firm founded a year earlier by Charles-Henri Filippi, the former head of CCF who became chairman and CEO of HSBC France, a finance inspector from an earlier generation, son and brother of finance inspectors. Filippi left HSBC at the end of 2008 and set up Alfina with his brother Pierre, who also chairs Fideas Capital, a small asset manager licensed by the AMF in 2007, specialising in quantitative and bond management. Alfina controls Fideas. Coustet takes charge of both.

In other words: having left Filippi’s CCF in the 1990s, Coustet is back with the same Filippi ten years later. The IGF network works like a safety net: you fall, you bounce back, always at the home of someone you know. The figures Coustet claims on his LinkedIn profile for this period, €1.5bn of advisory mandates and €300M under direct management, cannot be checked. Fideas Capital remains a modest firm today: a dozen staff, €2M in revenue, niche funds focused on climate and smart beta. Coustet no longer appears anywhere in its records. Filippi, meanwhile, left for Citigroup in 2011, the same year Coustet left. Purely a coincidence of timing.

After Fideas, Coustet goes back to Brazil. For good, this time. But this time, it won’t be a job in a subsidiary or a name on an organisation chart. It will be his own business.

In reality, Olivier Coustet’s new Brazilian story begins in one of those soulless streets of Luxembourg, where holding companies pile up in buildings that would put the finest examples of Soviet brutalism to shame.

Because the Brazilian firm, sorry, the boutique, as they say, is in fact a joint venture between Coustet, the Hottinguer bank, and a strange Luxembourg entity that answers (though not the phone) to the name HR Corportage Finance. One of those tucked-away companies, long chaired by Jean-Conrad Hottinguer, direct heir of the founding baron of the bank whose name and first name he bears, and who was a member of parliament for the Seine during the Hundred Days, then a Regent of the Banque de France.

Except that at Hottinguer, Coustet left a particular memory. A former employee of the bank in Brazil describes a recurring pattern: Coustet excelled at getting cheques out of management by presenting good intellectual ideas, projects that were credible on paper but with no concrete follow-through in execution. Management eventually tired of funding promises with no tangible result. According to this source, Coustet did not leave Hottinguer by mutual loss of interest. He was let go.

Mind you, that’s hardly putting the cat among the pigeons (or among any other bird, for that matter), it’s fairly common.

What is a little less common is an ENA graduate who has worked at the finance ministry doing business through Luxembourg in 2006, just as the Clearstream affair is in full swing. This is the scandal of the forged lists of accounts at the Luxembourg clearing house: Dominique de Villepin, then Prime Minister, is implicated, Nicolas Sarkozy files a complaint, and Luxembourg, as the clearing house’s home, is at the centre of everyone’s attention. Not the ideal moment to register a discreet finance vehicle there. Hottinguer does it anyway. Which remains legal, mind you.

Extract from the articles of association of Athos Investment in Luxembourg, which owns Athos Finance

Athos Finance was founded in 2006, based in São Paulo, and officially specialises in “corporate finance cross-border” advice. Coustet joins it in February 2011 as managing partner18 and stays three years, until 2014. In its brochures, Athos presents itself as a transcontinental hub specialising in cross-border strategic issues. Always a handy phrase for saying nothing while giving the impression of covering everything. The JV with Hottinguer is presented as a 50/50 “structural alliance”, almost a seal of Franco-Swiss old-money respectability. The brochure hammers it home: the house of Hottinguer is “independent”, heir to a “long standing heritage” of family bankers. The old world is keeping watch.

Extract from the articles of association of Athos in Luxembourg

As for scope, it’s broad. Very broad. Athos Brasil claims expertise in “Industrials, Food & Agri business, Healthcare, Retail, Media”. In other words, everything that exists between a cornfield and a TV studio. The document also points out that Hottinguer Corporate Finance was, in 2010, the “#4 French M&A boutique”. A statistic dug out of the cupboard to add some colour. Silence on actual activity in the years that followed. Silence on deal flow. Silence on the size of the teams on the Brazilian side.

Extract from an Athos brochure

And then there is the team. Coustet first, presented as a pile of titles spanning the finance ministry, life insurance and ministerial advice. We don’t know exactly what he does in Brazil, but we gather he has done a lot elsewhere. The other profiles follow the same logic: good education, smooth career, an international veneer, and above all nothing that explains the concrete link between these careers and what Athos Brasil does day to day.

That said, his former partner, Matthieu Hautefort, is more candid in a 2015 interview with Le Petit Journal, a news site for French expatriates19:

Big companies, he explained, send over their acquisition teams, for example, even though they don’t speak Portuguese, and that is how Athos Finance gets a lot of deals that have gone wrong, or nearly.

A financial professional in São Paulo who worked alongside Coustet in the early 2010s tells the same story from another angle. According to him, it always ended the same way: mistrust, then rows over money. Coustet regularly changed partners so as to owe them nothing, and allegedly helped himself along the way to a major client without paying his partner a penny. The portrait is always the same:

A skilful negotiator, in his description, but one who never handles the actual execution once the negotiations are over.

It’s hard to trace exactly which deals went through Athos. But among the few transactions that were financed, one stands out. Because of its consequences. And because of the way it ended.