Obviously, when the company starts losing a lot of money, the investors wake up.
Nah, just kidding.
Even when Masteos starts losing €1M or €2M a month, nobody reacts.
Worse: in early 2023, Masteos raises another round, led by the fund of EDF, the French state-controlled electricity giant, joined by SWEN (Arkea) and NCI, to move into energy-efficiency renovation. A highly interesting, promising and strategic subject… But the timing raises questions.
The commercial property market has just collapsed, residential has ground to a halt, rates keep rising… and there’s no way out for at least a year!
Maxime Hanquier justifies it:
The EDF fund, he explains, isn’t there to make multiples, but to find synergies with EDF and things that can have a positive impact in its field. But these are long processes, with a lot of legal work and national stakes.
In the month of the announcement, Masteos is already completely off-piste, with a burn of €5M, more than 2 times the plan, and a target of bringing it down to €1M.
Masteos’s big problem, Maxime Hanquier explains, is that decisions only take effect 6-10 months later. The boards were focused on the emergency, because the next few months looked bad.
A SaaS company can keep going with a smaller sales team. If Masteos cuts a salesperson in a city, business there stops. Which is one of the reasons the business doesn’t scale much, by the way.
And yet Daphni had installed Claude Lesterlin as CFO (who left for the French online media outlet Brut last October), a man who describes himself as the guarantor of the invested capital to the shareholder funds.
Oops.
At the next board meeting, the figure is announced. Nobody moves. Nobody bats an eyelid. Nobody reacts.
Because VC is a big-swinging-dick business. So everyone acts tough. And where anyone else would say “who the hell is the idiot who did this?” and then “OK, how do we clean up this mess…”, no decision is taken.
Why?
The reasons aren’t very clear, but they are clearly irrational. There are big egos and a kind of rivalry, including on boards where rival VCs sit. But above all there’s a will to tell yourself that nothing is serious, that everything will get better, even if it means locking yourself into an incredible herd denial, somewhere between collective lying, mental contagion and confirmation bias.
Or else, more rationally, everyone knew it was over.
So a company that has failed will need refinancing, fast.
The few responses from the VCs seem out of touch. When costs need cutting, Daphni brings in hugely expensive C-level executives.
To restructure? Out goes Maxime Hanquier, in comes Thomas Maudet at €370K a year including payroll taxes.
Too many people? Out goes Maëlle Lang, in comes Stéphanie Fraise (ex-BlablaCar, Dailymotion) at €250K. She will leave the company in November to join OpenClassrooms.
Need growth? Hello Manuel Lesueur, the new CMO at €300K.
And so on.
To cut costs, the VCs have just added €3M to the payroll.
One example among many.