💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 04

Weighing the organs

So in the end Legend never needed money. Profitable from its first financial year, 17 times more profitable the year after (in French)57. But at the end of 2024, another idea comes along: opening up the capital, not to raise funds, but so the partners can pocket part of what the company is worth. A good old-fashioned cash-out.

The mandate goes to Norman K., a Parisian boutique for wealth management and M&A advice, August Debouzy takes the legal side, and the deal stays on the market for more than 1 year before anything is signed. Long enough for all of media Paris to parade past the data room.

First, the most prestigious. Bernard Arnault, LVMH’s boss, long tipped as the winner, to the point that everything else is put on hold while he takes a look. He’s the one Guillaume Pley wants. But everything freezes, and in the end it comes to nothing. The file had been passed down to his son Antoine, who was due to take over that area, and a row over Le Parisien, the Paris daily the group owns, supposedly closed the matter, according to one version that has circulated. But according to a source close to the family, who spoke to Zero Bullshit on condition of anonymity, the reality is even more brutal: the patriarch, who had tried to sell Le Parisien in September 2025 before buying the Challenges magazine group 2 months later, reportedly wants to lighten the media ship. The arrival of Michèle Benbunan, formerly head of the press distributor Presstalis and then of the publisher Editis, at the head of LVMH’s press division is said to be mainly about lifting the results… so as to fetch a good price. Another executive of the group, who says he is close to the family, reports that the billionaire delivered a cutting verdict: none of his children has the skills to take over this branch. Then, his voice dropping:

Or perhaps, he adds, none of them has the will.

The link with Legend isn’t broken for all that. It is through this deal that LVMH comes to buy advertising, the watch manufacture in December 2025 with the son, under the label “paid partnership”. And it is for the same reason that Jean-Claude Tréhan, the group’s director of external relations, advises his boss, just before the summer of 2026, to go on Legend to get ahead of the series of articles Le Monde is about to publish. On 8 July, Bernard Arnault58 sits down in the armchair. 1h41. 1.8M views. AI dubbing into 7 languages. No commercial label. No Business tag. The house pays in December, the boss talks for free in July. 11 days later, Le Monde starts publishing “L’empire Bernard Arnault” [The Bernard Arnault empire], 6 episodes drawn from 6 months of investigation, including one on his relations with the media and with presidents59. On 26 July, again on Tréhan’s advice, Arnault replies on X: 3 pages that read more like a man who is stung and pretending not to care than like an exercise in style.

Further south, another billionaire has a different plan. Rodolphe Saadé, the shipping magnate, would like to merge Legend with Brut and take 55% of the capital. Pley thinks it over. Talks begin with Nicolas de Tavernost in charge of the media arm, but he soon leaves to chair LFP Média, the commercial subsidiary of France’s professional football league, and they are suspended. Then the media arm of CMA CGM, chaired by Véronique Saadé, Rodolphe’s wife, gets a new chief executive at the end of August 2025, Claire Léost, from the magazine publisher Prisma60. The deal starts up again, and dies a second time. Not over price. Because the project doesn’t suit Pley, who would rather stay head of the empire. In the most literal sense.

The host also turns down another merger, with his friend Alexandre Yazdi. At the same time, the boss of the mobile games studio Voodoo is negotiating to buy DC Company, the parent of Konbini, the satirical site Le Gorafi, Herstory and C’est Qui La Boss, a deal finalised in May 2026. The problem is that the group is heavily loss-making, whereas Legend is highly profitable. The conversation ends quickly.

Then, as every time a media outlet goes up for sale, along comes Bolloré, the billionaire, in person to meet Pley. That tells you how much weight he gives it. Maxime Saada, boss of the pay-TV group Canal+, puts in an offer. The TV producer Stéphane Courbit drops by too. The TV host Cyril Hanouna gets the file from one of his friends, but someone close to him says he was never more than curious about it. There is also a Lebanese businessman based in Dubai, who owns media there and wants to replicate the Legend format abroad, but his bid falls through with the war in Iran. As does TRAIL, the fund of Xavier Marin, a former member of the management board of the investment firm Eurazeo, whose vehicle is called SLAM, for sport, luxury, art, media, and whose mandate is precisely to buy small businesses built around a personality. The only one whose purpose fits exactly what is for sale. But the proposal doesn’t convince.

Pierre-Édouard Stérin makes an offer too. He is ready to do anything for what he calls, in front of the sellers, simply the project. But it is Diaz who refuses outright, and very quickly. Nor is it the only door Diaz shuts on him: in 2023 Stérin had bought into Le Crayon6162, another interview outlet, founded in 2021 by 4 partners in their twenties, with 28 shareholders by the summer of 2025 for €1M of equity, taking 3%. In October 2025, Le Crayon’s co-founder announces (with a bang) his exit, and that same month, on 8 October63, Diaz announces that Influx is buying into the group, by acquiring those very shares. Since March 2026, Le Crayon has been producing with the agency a wholly owned subsidiary, Les Financiers, where Baccino appears.

Mediawan, the film and TV production group, arrives like everyone else, at the start of 2025. It is its chairman, Pierre-Antoine Capton, partner of Xavier Niel and Matthieu Pigasse, who handles the deal. He meets Pley in January 2026, then 3 times in March.

Pley and his team are received at the group’s offices, in Paris’s 7th arrondissement, where the entrance hall is dominated by a big statue of Miraculous, one of the house’s biggest hits, alongside The Count of Monte Cristo, the Netflix series Adolescence, HPI for TF1 or L’Agence, adapted in several countries. Mediawan has also set up 2 studios for flow content, like the podcasts springing up everywhere. Like Legend. But the projects are floundering. As is influencer monetisation, notably in Germany, modelled on what Emakina did, which remains marginal. Between the sellers and the buyer, the conversation quickly goes nowhere. The Pley camp feels it is talking to boomers who don’t understand what it brings. The Mediawan plan is summed up by someone close to the deal:

The idea, he says, was: we’ll do it ourselves anyway, so team up with us now.

Forgetting that the point of Legend is neither the studio, nor the distribution, nor Mediawan’s capacity to produce, quite extraordinary, let’s say it. It’s Guillaume Pley.

And finally FG Bros, who will sign. The family office of Ségolène Frère and Ian Gallienne, present in champagne, cosmetics and construction-site security. A diversification line, not a media business. And so probably a less hands-on investor.

That leaves the price. And there, not everyone agrees, despite a shared data room. Because each of them opens the books, and each finds the same thing. Around 60% of revenue rests on one man. A source who worked on a due diligence puts it more bluntly:

When you open the accounts and the company, he says, you see that everything rests on Guillaume Pley, and if Guillaume Pley crashes and burns, there is nothing left.

And the issue comes up with everyone: the main asset is the main risk. A player who made an offer explains it without beating about the bush:

Legend, he says, is above all a show, and every producer knows that changing a presenter is very risky. It was hard for Samuel Étienne to follow Julien Lepers as a TV quiz host. Christophe Dechavanne replacing Philippe Bouvard on Les Grosses Têtes in 2000 was, in his words, an outright industrial accident. Everyone knew, he says, that Legend was worth nothing. Only Guillaume Pley was.

A former Legend staffer explains that the risk was well known:

Guillaume Pley, he says, saw very quickly the risk hanging over Legend. First for himself, because the production work was intense. But also to give the show value in other ways. That is why other formats and hosts were brought in.

Except that these other hosts, Lola Fillon for instance, mostly present the secondary formats, usually without a face to carry them and less watched, or ones that aren’t on the channel, produced for clients or advertisers.

So the question that arises, and that was answered fast this summer, is how stable Pley’s image is, as this executive at a company that had the file in hand explains:

They knew, he says, that Guillaume Pley had a somewhat murky past from his radio days, which might resurface. The question was put to him, and broadly everyone was reassured because it was long ago. The issue wasn’t whether it would come back one day, that was obvious. It was rather whether something bigger could emerge, and whether some behaviour might have continued.

And that question isn’t specific to Legend. Just as these books are being opened, the affair surrounding the host Sébastien Cauet has been making headlines for months, but above all, another former radio star, of the same generation as Pley, who has become one of the faces of a channel, is the subject of an investigation in preparation, with many testimonies. His producer knows it. So do those putting in offers. And that risk has a cost.

Except that while the haggling goes on, the base is shifting. The figures move so fast that they are updated every quarter, without waiting for the year-end accounts. And sales go beyond mere advertisers. In October 2025, Legend’s shows join Air France’s in-flight entertainment catalogue, on the screens of its long-haul fleet. That’s not an offer, it’s a client: the airline buys a stock of already-filmed shows, and it pays for them. €1M a year, for 3 years.

A revenue line that depends on no ad slot, no guest, and that renews itself. That’s what a multiple capitalises best, and the asking price rose with it. The amount of the contract isn’t public. The brand also branches out onto the shelves: a collection of 10 books is announced, and Pley’s book on the behind-the-scenes of the show comes out with Hors Cadre the month after the signing. Catalogue and brand, in other words assets that don’t sit in the armchair. And that makes for a very tidy net profit (in French) for Legend:

  • €96K in 2023;
  • €1.7M in 2024;
  • €3.8M in 202557.

Legend Metamedia’s net profit, in € millions

Annual accounts filed at the commercial court registry. All the figures on Zero Bullshit’s data page (in French)

It remains to be seen how the buyers will value all this. The offers all arrive at the same time, in the spring of 2026, as the process closes, and they are staggered on a single figure: the 2025 net profit, which the bidders have in the data room before it is published, that of Q1 2026, and a 2026 projection.

Before reading on: place each offer, in millions of euros of valuation

Mediawan puts down: €2M for half the shares, implicitly valuing the whole at €4M, with an earnout to be defined. 1x EBIT. TRAIL at €55M: 14x. And a string of offers hovering between €35M and €40M: 9 to 10x. But it is FG Bros that signs, on 12 May 20266465: €17M for around 24%, a valuation of €72M. 19x. A sum shared between Pley and Influx. And which was therefore the highest bid.

How many times 2025 net profit, offer by offer

2025 net profit of €3.82M. Argos Index mid-market, Q1 2026. All the figures on Zero Bullshit’s data page (in French)

19x net profit is off the usual scale. In Q1 2026, European SMEs sell at a median of 8.6x EBITDA, a broader measure than profit, and deals above 15 times account for only 6% of transactions66. For a media business: Brut, 250 staff and €140M raised, was worth €268M at its last funding round in 2024 (in French). For a company that lost €35M in 2025 on €38M of revenue (in French). Legend, some forty people and €0 raised, is worth 72.

Except the seller wasn’t counting that way. Around the table, the price was being discussed at roughly 8x earnings, recalculated every quarter so fast was the growth, and with the stock to be valued. At that multiple, €72M implies a base of €9M, more than double the 2025 profit. So the multiple that set the price wasn’t applied to an actual profit, but to a profit that didn’t yet exist, on revenue of €17.8M over the past year.

What FG Bros bought is a fast return on investment. With EBIT estimated at €8M in 2026, and steady growth, the €17M pays for itself in under 5 years just by holding a quarter of the balance sheet.

But what Pley and Diaz sold is much more than that. If they were ready to lower their demands for Arnault, it was for the prestige and the doors it was supposed to open. But FG Bros puts down €17M for only 25%, which lets them:

  • Pocket a handsome sum;
  • Consider a capital increase if they want to dilute them or make them pay in again, and/or do a second cash-out;
  • Keep control of the media business with investors known for being discreet.

Where Mediawan wanted half, plus approval rights over certain extraordinary decisions to secure effective control, which a Legend executive translates as imposing guests, or even pundits, FG Bros offers one seat, a quarterly strategy committee that appoints the chairman and sets the budget, a ban on selling for 5 years, and nothing about guests. Nothing exotic: the Influx shareholder-agreement committee, in 2022, was already meeting every month52.

And while all this was being negotiated, Pley was taking money out: €1.8M in dividends over 2025, approved 2 months before the signing. On the very day, he has a line added to what Legend Metamedia declares as its line of business: the broadcasting of advertising65.