On 4 September 2024, Sir Martin Moore-Bick publishes the final report of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. Seven years, two months and twenty-one days after the events. Seven volumes, around 1,700 pages, 58 recommendations. And one sentence that sums it all up: the fire was “the culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry”. Decades. The word is in the report.

The report names Arconic, Celotex, Kingspan, Rydon, Studio E, RBKC, KCTMO, building control, the certification bodies, the British state. It speaks of “systematic dishonesty” by the manufacturers. It describes a mechanism in which information was available, ignored, repeated, then normalised. It is all documented. It is all public. And now what?

A clarification is needed here. In February 2020, the Attorney General, Suella Braverman, granted the inquiry an “undertaking”: individuals’ oral evidence cannot be used against them in any future criminal prosecution. That was the condition for them to talk. Without that guarantee, the witnesses’ lawyers had warned, their clients would invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer. The result: the revelations were possible, the damning emails were read out loud, the people responsible described their choices in front of the cameras. But their own words cannot be used to convict them. The documents, on the other hand, remain usable. And the companies do not enjoy that protection. Establishing the truth and criminal justice do not follow the same rules.

The Metropolitan Police has been investigating since the night of the fire. 180 investigators, 19 companies and 58 individuals identified as potential suspects. The Met is aiming for the end of 2025 to submit its files to the Crown Prosecution Service, after 12 to 18 months of analysing the report. Trials, if there are any, will not begin before mid-2027. Ten years after the fire.

Meanwhile, financial redress is running its course. In April 2023, a settlement is reached: £150M for around 900 claimants. Bereaved families, survivors, residents. The deal was negotiated through “Alternative Dispute Resolution”, with no trial and no admission of liability. Arconic pays. Kingspan contributes. Rydon pays its share. Nobody admits anything. The firefighters, for their part, obtained £20M for 114 of them, traumatised by what they saw that night. The money moves, the files close, the companies walk away with their stock market listings intact.

Then there is the political response. The Building Safety Act of 2022. The ban on combustible materials in external walls, extended and tightened. A new regulator. Tougher obligations. As of 31 December 2023, six and a half years after Grenfell, 24% of the high-rise buildings covered by the Building Safety Fund had completed remediation of their dangerous cladding. The government is aiming for 2029 to finish. Twelve years after the fire.

A public inquiry that documents everything. A police investigation that takes ten years. Compensation without admission. Reforms applied drop by drop. At every stage, the system absorbs. It acknowledges, it compensates, it legislates, it postpones. It turns 72 deaths into procedures, budgets, timetables. The truth is established, responsibility stays diffuse, justice stays theoretical.

In reality, the system did not fail at Grenfell.
It worked exactly as designed.

And just as the inquiry was getting under way, on 5 November 2018, two buildings collapsed on Rue d’Aubagne in Noailles, a run-down neighbourhood in the centre of Marseille, France’s second city.
Eight dead.
Two injured.

And, once again, responsibilities that everyone refuses to take.