💥 Zero Bullshit
Chapitre 01

The glass is three-quarters empty

Turn the glass over. Under the base, a number in relief, which you took for your age when you were 8. It was the mould number. Some only found out much later. Others eventually forgot. The glass, though, hasn't changed. Heavy, built to bounce off a school canteen's tiled floor without shattering. It comes out of a single factory, in La Chapelle-Saint-Mesmin, on the banks of the Loire near Orléans, where a furnace has been tempering glass since 1945. It's a Duralex, the glassware that generations of French children drank from at school.

In 2024, the factory nearly closes. Again. Its employees make the move nobody expected: they buy it. 148 of them put €500 of their pay on the table to become members of the cooperative. The press loves it, ministers queue up to visit, the takeover becomes a symbol. Workers saving their tools from deindustrialisation. Some think of Lip, the watch factory its workers took over in the 1970s. Others see the defeat of the long-lunch money men. The enemy François Hollande, before becoming president, called his real adversary.

A year later, the factory needs a bigger helping hand, and it doesn't go to a bank for it. It goes to the crowd, on Lita, a platform that offers to give your savings meaning. To invest in the literal sense, it says, without ever explaining what a figurative investment might be. The words and the emotion do their job, and they do it fast. In 48 hours, 20,000 people pledge €20M when the factory had asked for €5M, the cap at which the raise stops1. For glasses.

But ask one of those 20,000 what they just bought, and they'll tell you Duralex. Wrong. What they signed up for is neither a glass nor a share of the factory. Not even really a loan. It's a participating security (titre participatif), a cooperative financing instrument that almost nobody has heard of before clicking. It gives them no slice of the company, no say in decisions, and no firm promise of getting their money back by a given date. The day the business runs into trouble, they go to the very back of the queue, just ahead of the shareholders, which is to say more or less last. That line exists, in writing, in the documents2. On the night of the raise, it exists in nobody's mind. That night, everyone is saving Duralex. The press goes as far as calling it a donation. Asked at the time, Julien Benayoun, chief executive of Lita, answered Zero Bullshit:

Unfortunately, he said, Lita has no control over the media narrative, and the team tears its hair out whenever the press talks about donations, because that is not what it does. The press release, he added, is clear, and the disclaimers are everywhere Lita controls the message: the Lita project page, the sign-up process and the emails.
Julien Benayoun, chief executive of Lita3

Lita's sales pitch highlights six exits at an annualised return of 18%. Its actual track record is less shiny: a loss rate of 12.26%, entry fees of 1 to 3%, and right at the bottom of its own returns ranking, a -63.21%45. Duralex won't be an isolated case there: the platform is already dragging Innoya, Bioburger, Realites and Vestia through default or restructuring.

What Lita shows off, and what its track record says

Finance Héros and Argent & Salaire, May 2026.

By May, the employees had received only half their pay6. On 1 June 2026, Duralex goes into court-supervised receivership, its fifth in twenty-odd years1. The coffers are empty. And the 20,000 who had saved the glass now line up in a queue of their own, the creditors' queue, their money frozen while a court decides their fate2. The glass didn't break. It doesn't know how. It's the people around it who got a hangover.

The impulse that got 20,000 people to sign up for glasses is as old as money, and it often picks the wrong gesture. When Notre-Dame burns, 340,000 donors give enough to rebuild it, and even €140M too much7. Donating suits a cathedral, which can't be sold or bought back. The same mechanism kicks in every year with the Téléthon, France's televised charity marathon, which raises around €80M a year (€83.5M in 2025) thanks to tear-jerking coverage, while plenty of less televised causes struggle to exist at all.

But a brand doesn't survive on donations or tears. It survives on the shopping trolley. France has just relearned this with Lajaunie cachous. The little yellow tin of liquorice pastilles from Toulouse, 145 years on the clock, left the shelves in 2025, and a petition demanding it be saved immediately gathered more than 14,000 signatures8. Except that no financier in top hat and monocle woke up one morning and decided to kill off the cachous. No. It's simpler than that. The brand died because there weren't enough people left to buy it. Others will die. Others will arrive. But the Lajaunie tin brought back enough memories of an era when everyone already thought things were better before, for a few people to decide it had to be saved. And probably to save their fantasy of their own youth, rather than a brand they no longer bought either. Just like Duralex, then.

A company needs a product to sell, and doesn't exist without customers. Even if the product is never really finished. Star Citizen, a space video game under construction since 2012, still hasn't come out, but its players keep paying for spaceships they won't fly for a long time9. Or at least not in a fully finished universe. One they sometimes watch being built in front of them. But they aren't buying a share of the studio. They're buying a ship, or the idea of a ship. They're investing in a future experience they imagine will be better, making do with what they already have. That's what crowdfunding was in the beginning. Pre-ordering and supporting.

Green-Got lives somewhere in the middle of all that. A green neobank that sells a wooden card and a promise: your money no longer funds oil. But behind the pitch, what's on sale is less a product than a cause. A side to take. You on one side, the old world funding the drilling on the other. At the centre, a shock figure the startup hammered home for a long time: the money sitting in current accounts supposedly weighs several tonnes of CO2 a year. While the carbon footprint of the average French person is said to be around 10t of CO2 equivalent a year, keeping a few thousand euros at BNP, the French bank, would supposedly emit as much. All thanks to a clever calculation, called out several times here (in French), which held up until the day Bon Pote, a French climate outlet, looked at it closely. And the day the consultancy that provided the scientific seal of approval, the famous Carbone 4, co-founded by French climate commentator Jean-Marc Jancovici, withdrew the article that served as its endorsement10. Green-Got has toned it down since. But at heart, and in the wallet, nothing has moved. Joining Green-Got means fighting big bad capitalism and saving the planet.

Greenwashing, disruption, or the end justifying the means. Whatever. The verdict matters less than the rhetoric and the result: that's how, on 17 June, 16 days after Duralex fell, Green-Got opened its capital to its own community for the third time in 3 years. And managed, in 52 minutes, to convince 5,286 people to put in €8M1112.