The 2024 subscribers bought A shares through a Tudigo SPV. The letter matters. If the brewery is sold, the articles of association set an order of priority for dividing the price among shareholders.
This is the famous liquid pref, the liquidation preference. It caps nothing: A shareholders can convert their shares into ordinary shares at any time. When the company is sold, they therefore take the better of the 2 options. If the price is low, they get their stake back before everyone else. If the price is high, they convert and take their share of the whole price, like any other shareholder. In a bankruptcy, there is nothing to share out.
At the end of 2025, Dufossez is already looking for fresh money, privately. He sets up Brique House Ventures, a company tailored to 2 French tax breaks. Article 150-0 B ter of the tax code lets an entrepreneur who has sold a business defer tax on the capital gain if they reinvest it. The Madelin relief knocks part of the money put into the capital of small businesses off income tax. Brique House Ventures can raise up to €4M and finds only €634K. This money goes into the holding company at the very start of 2026, in exchange for new ordinary shares. A 2nd issue, opened at the same time, does not find a single buyer: even with a tax break, wealthy investors are no longer following.
Except it isn’t enough. In summer 2026, the statutory auditor triggers its formal alert procedure: the bank debt falls due at the end of the year, and the company’s survival is at stake. The recovery plan adopted in July provides, as a last resort, for closing bars, and the Reims bar disappears from the brand’s website. Fresh money is needed. Those willing to put more in will take the risk, but on one condition: being paid first if the brewery is sold, ahead of the 2024 subscribers.
And what does a great company do when it has run out of money and the pros no longer want to fund it? Anyone who answered “it goes to a bank” is invited to reread the previous 478 episodes. Obviously, it taps retail, through crowdfunding.
And so here comes the 7th round, reserved for a few existing shareholders hand-picked by Brique House: up to €2M of new shares, called B shares, at the same price of €6.31. If the company is sold, B shareholders get back 1.5x their stake first. A shareholders keep their liquid pref, but it now only comes after the B shares’ one. And the B shares come with a gift: whoever buys some can turn into B shares all the shares they have bought over the past 28 months. The Brique House Ventures investors, who came in at the end of 2025 with ordinary shares paid last, can therefore jump ahead of the 2024 subscribers by putting in a little more money. The Mulliez family, the family behind the French retailer Auchan and already a shareholder, puts money back in this way. How many B shares were actually issued, Brique House has not said.
The 2024 subscribers, meanwhile, are left out in the cold. Their shares sit in TUDI HOLDING 97, an SPV that none of them controls. Its chairman is still Vromman, the CFO of Tudigo, a platform that has since been liquidated. The European crowdfunding regulation forbids a platform from holding a stake in the raises it offers34. ESMA, the EU’s markets regulator, adds that an SPV must not be used to get around this ban35. As early as January 2025, Tudigo’s compliance department flags the risk: the platform sets up its SPVs itself, keeps their single share until it can hand it over, and has Vromman chair them. The transfer to a separate entity, Tudigo Relation Investisseur, seems to have been forgotten, the department writes, and is the subject of an incident report. Nearly 2 years later, Vromman is still chairman. It has not been possible to establish whether this SPV was invited to buy B shares. Yet in September, Dufossez assures on LinkedIn that Tudigo’s proceedings will in no way affect their investment in BH, and welcomes the fact that some long-standing shareholders have even strengthened their positions.
The problem of Vromman chairing the SPVs was known, as an internal Tudigo report dated 2025 shows
The money is still short. Which leaves the 8th round, the one under way. In early October, Brique House opens its raise to everyone, on Crowdcube. The pre-registration page promised shares at the same price for everyone36. The price is indeed the same, €6.31, exactly the 2023 price. In the meantime, the subsidiaries have lost €7.2M in 2025 alone and the holding company owes more than it owns: for the same price, the new shareholder buys a slice of a company far poorer than in 2023. The rights, however, are not the same. Newcomers get neither A nor B shares, but a 3rd class of shares, A’. If the company is sold, these get their investment back at the same rank as the B shares, but only 1x, while the B shares get 1.5x theirs. Crowdcube investors are therefore better placed than the 2024 subscribers, who are paid after them, and worse placed than B shareholders. Newcomers also accept a drag-along37. And above everyone sits Convivialité Ventures, Pernod Ricard’s fund, which keeps, in most cases, a veto over new shares, the budget, borrowing and any sale below €18.93, 3x the current price.
On Crowdcube, Brique House is shown at €59.7M. Almost double 2023. Obviously, this figure measures no wealth at all: it is the share price, still €6.31, multiplied by a number of shares that grows with every raise. The holding company itself doesn’t believe it. In its accounts, it reckons that most of the €23.3M lent to its bars and its brewery will never come back, and now values its subsidiaries, loans included, at only €2.1M. So the Crowdcube subscriber buys a slice of a company shown at €59.7M, whose bars and brewery are worth 28x less according to its own accounts.
What Brique House is worth, depending on who’s counting
So what is left for the 2024 subscribers? If the brewery were sold for €20M, 10% would first go to all shareholders. B and A’ shareholders would then receive their preference, which the company puts at €13.6M. All the other shares, those of TUDI HOLDING 97 included, would share at best €6.4M. That amount shrinks with every A’ share sold and every conversion into B shares. And that €20M assumes a buyer willing to pay it for a group whose subsidiaries have just lost €7.2M in a year.
If the brewery were sold for €20M, in order of payout
In short: retail gets taken for a ride at every round. Professional investors didn’t want to follow: Brique House Ventures found only €634K out of €4M. Members of the public did, 4 times over:
Whoever brings in the money when the professionals stop putting any in gets the worst terms. And if the brewery goes bust, nobody gets anything.