Savings are a matter of fashion. Some will call it a cycle. A cycle responds to an economic phase. Products sold to retail investors respond first and foremost to marketing. Not that marketing is a crime, you have to sell somehow. But asset classes ride advertising waves to capture the attention, and the savings, of retail.
Around 2010, something tipped. The internet. Which had existed for 20 years already, obviously, with massive take-up. What changed was elsewhere: the internet stopped being a tool and became a window onto tools. The moment the word became what “AI” is now, a catch-all stuck onto loads of things that have nothing to do with it.
Mobile did the rest. In 2009, BNP launched the first French banking app, Les bons comptes, followed by Société Générale, then by everyone within 3 years. Online banks had been around for a long time (Boursorama from 1998, Fortuneo in 2000, first as a broker, ING in 2000 with a savings account), but it was that decade that built trust. And it was precisely on that trust that the future fintechs were born, including Lydia (2017), a payment app whose name has since become a common noun in France, and the whole galaxy of those who have, as they put it, digitalised savings.
Yomoni led the way from 2015 with its managed life insurance (France’s favourite savings wrapper), a double break with the past on customer experience and on fees, joined by Nalo in 2017. Since then, fintechs have sprung up like business schools, and often wilted just as fast: the sinews of war are still acquisition, between €20 and €250 per customer depending on profile and amount. A cost that killed the small players, pushed the big ones into pharaonic spending (Trade Republic) and repositioned the rest on B2B2C (OpenStone, Shares). Which, in hindsight, is rather funny: several players who built their pitch against middlemen now rely almost exclusively on traditional distributors, financial advisers and family offices, to reach retail.
Overall, the fintechs forced the market to fall in line, on fees as on accessibility. With the notable exception of BPCE, all the big French banks launched an online offering, with more (Boursobank) or less (Bforbank) success. The textbook example remains the instant transfer: built into Lydia from launch, heavily pushed by Revolut and N26, “offered free” by the banks in 2024, just as the law was about to force them to. The system had been ready since the launch of Target 2 in 2007.
Boursorama
Online banking is already here.
Fortuneo and ING
First as a broker for one, with a savings account for the other.
Target 2
The system that makes instant transfers possible is ready.
Les bons comptes, at BNP
The first French banking app. Everyone follows within 3 years.
Yomoni
Managed life insurance, cheaper.
Nalo
Same promise, on customer experience and on fees.
Instant transfers “offered free”
By the banks, just as the law was about to force them to.
Then came accessibility, what the pros call retailisation: selling private individuals products reserved for the rich or for professionals. Depending on how you read the rules and the words used, it is more or less legal. Because under MiFID II, a professional investor meets precise criteria, so does a non-professional, and you are not allowed to talk to them the same way, with the same licences, or to palm off the same products on them1.
The pitch, meanwhile, never changes:
Roughly speaking, and exaggerating a bit, those observations are fairly true. The conclusion, on the other hand, is a sophism.
“So I’m going to make these products available to you, and so you’ll be able to get rich like the rich”
Which is factually false.
At BlackRock, the biggest credit fund has a $250K minimum. Buyout at KKR, $1M. Becoming an LP at CVC, between $2M and $5M. On some of the funds these platforms give access to, the minimum ticket even climbs to between €10M and €20M. For regulatory reasons, and because the manager has no desire whatsoever to deal with an army of private individuals he considers incapable of understanding. OpenStone’s model: buy a stake in these funds, cut it into pieces, and sell the pieces. Private equity, including real estate, signed Ares, EQT or Carlyle, from €30K2.
The minimum ticket, depending on the way in (to scale, dollars and euros lumped together)
The price of the slicing, though, isn’t necessarily easy to understand. The structure is always the same: a layer of platform fees, entry charges, annual management of the vehicle, sometimes a share of performance, stacked on top of those of the underlying fund, which already takes its management fee and its carry. Which is, logically, the price of the service provided. OpenStone’s blog states entry fees of between 0 and 2%3, confirmed by one of its executives, whereas an outside review found more like 5% on a product distributed in 20244. Two figures that may well be compatible, precisely for the reason given: the first is what the platform earns, the second is the product and everything inside it, all in.
In detail, the annual layer of a platform of this kind runs at around 1 to 1.25%, of which 0.35 to 0.5% goes to the partner asset manager, with another 0.75% passed on to the financial adviser when the product is sold through one. On an infrastructure fund, the cut comes down to more like 0.75%.
That said, slicing isn’t quite the right word: on some platforms the vehicle is neither a feeder nor a closed-end fund, but active management pooling several funds chosen to complement each other by geography, company size and sector, whereas a feeder simply mirrors a single underlying fund. The layers still add up: up to 2% a year at the distributor, before a single euro of the underlying fund’s fees. On a product locked up for 8 years, that’s 16% of the capital for the middleman alone.
But fine, nothing out of the ordinary. Real estate private equity or an LBO fund isn’t exactly sexy. Late-stage investing, though, doesn’t market the product. Not even the names of the managers insiders know. It puts the end product up front. Epic Games. OpenAI. Anthropic. SpaceX. Investments that are closed off partly because they are complex, but also and above all because demand is huge, and the pockets of investment, unlike demand, don’t stretch.
Which raises a question.
Imagine you’re sitting on the opportunity of the century. A sure-fire win. Like investing in Zero Bullshit, and so making 1,000x in 18 months. You let a mate in on it. But why share it with loads of strangers? The reasoning has one limit: if there’s €1M to invest and each of you only has €100K, you might as well pool the money.
Because that is exactly the question everyone should be asking about late-stage private equity. Why would anyone give up their seat?